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Abstract 
Utilities use Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems as their industrial control 
system. The architecture of these systems in the past was based on them being isolated from 
other networks. Now with recent ever changing requirements of capabilities from these 
systems there is a need to converge with information technology systems and with the need to 
have these industrial networks communicating on packet switched networks there are cyber 
security concerns that come up.  
This research project looks at the whether using encryption in an IP/MPLS core network for 
SCADA in an OT IT environment has an effect on the performance requirements. This was 
done through an experimental simulation with the results recorded. The research project also 
looks at the key literature study considerations.  
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CHAPTER 1 
1.  Introduction 
1.1. Background 
The background of this research is based on the fact that industrial networks including 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems were initially designed and 
developed as isolated networks and with minimal or no security at all. The purposes of this 
research project is to determine if encryption as part of the whole Cybersecurity value chain, 
can be used to secure communication in SCADA system and still allow SCADA service 
commands to be executed as per minimum SCADA performance requirements. This research 
is of extreme importance because SCADA systems are deployed in various industries 
including critical infrastructure networks such as in utilities. This means an attack on these 
SCADA systems can be very catastrophic including the loss of human lives. Thus this 
research project seeks to determine the most suitable encryption standard for SCADA 
systems in utilities.  
1.2. Key Research Question 
The key research question for this project is “whether using encryption in SCADA systems, 
the services performance requirements are still met in OT/ IT environment over an MPLS 
core network”? The research project will determine if SCADA services still perform as per 
minimum requirements over an encrypted MPLS/IP network in an OT/IT environment.  
1.3. Research Objective 
The primary objective for the research project is thus is to research and demonstrate that 
encryption is essential for secure SCADA communication over a MPLS/IP core network. 
Encryption forms an essential part of the Cyber Security value chain which has to achieve the 
following cyber security objectives  
 
Confidentiality: ensuring that the information source is really from that source. 
Integrity: ensuring that the information has not been altered in any way. 
Availability: ensuring that system is not comprised but that it is available. 
 
These objectives of encryption should be met with SCADA service performance 
requirements not violated which is the objective of the research project. Thus the key 
research question focuses only on the encryption part of the Cyber Security value chain of 
SCADA over an encrypted MPLS/IP network and no other aspects or areas. 
1.4. Methodology 
The research project had two components, the technical component and the non-technical 
component as part of completing the identified tasks. For the non-technical aspect, a detailed 
literature survey was conducted. The literature survey discusses an overview of SCADA, its 
components and its service requirements in an OT IT environment. The literature survey also 
discusses the OT IT environment and its operating principles and convergence between IT 
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and OT. Furthermore a discussion is given for IP/MPLS core networks, including its design 
consideration and methodology for SCADA in OT IT environment. The literature survey also 
discusses encryption techniques of which together with the IP/MPLS core network forms part 
of a critical part of this research project. A vulnerability assessment and ethical hacking 
techniques of SCADA systems is discussed to give typical SCADA vulnerabilities. This is to 
give an understanding of SCADA vulnerabilities and show to what extend can encryption 
assist in the whole SCADA cybersecurity value chain and also assist with preparing with 
regards to those vulnerabilities. The non-technical component sets to achieve or serve as a 
guide in terms of the best practice with regards to the role of encryption in the whole value 
chain and also what is the best design approach regarding the IP/MPLS core network with 
security and OT/IT convergence in mind. Thus the non-technical component sets the 
theoretical foundation for the simulation experiment. 
The technical component involved implementing and testing the encryption and decryption 
for various SCADA services over an IP/MPLS core network. The overview is that the 
encryption and decryption was implemented using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-
256) on periphery routers of the IP/MPLS core network. Then various SCADA system 
services commands were simulated into the network using a SCADA simulator called 
FieldComm. FieldComm is a communications tool for use with DNP3.0 protocol networks 
and devices (TruData Consulting, 2008). These commands will be encrypted and propagated 
through the virtually developed IP/MPLS network then decrypted and passed through to the 
remote terminal unit (RTU) to be executed.  
1.5. SCADA and RTU setting 
The initial test bench setup would involve setting up and configuring the remote terminal 
with the SCADA simulator. FieldComm will be used to generate and simulate various 
SCADA services. The purpose for this stage was to ensure correct operation of SCADA 
commands and the execution by the RTU. This will ensure that FieldComm and the RTU. 
This is illustrated in the figure below. 
 
Figure 1.1 FieldComm, RTU and protection relay setup (Chego, 2014) 
1.6. IP/MPLS Network 
The next stage of the test bench would be the creation and the design of the MPLS core 
network. The MPLS network was designed by using GNS3. GNS3 is an open source 
telecommunications network design platform. It allows an accurate network design 
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mimicking real life conditions. Most networks can be designed firstly on GNS3 and then be 
implemented practically. The ideal MPLS core network for a very large utility is shown in 
Appendix A as example. This type of network requires high levels of computational and 
processing power, therefore for the purposes of this research only a scaled version of the 
network was implemented as per the processing capabilities of the computer used. The 
network is an IP-based network using routers. Once the network was build and configured, at 
its periphery a machine running FieldComm will be interfaced to the network with the RTU 
interface on the other end. The implementation of this setup is given in more details in 
chapter 8. The above overview is illustrated in the following figure. 
 
Figure 1.2 SCADA services through an MPLS network setup (Chego, 2014) 
1.7. SCADA Encryption and Decryption Implementation 
The next stage would involve the implementation of encryption/decryption. Both the 
encryption and decryption algorithms will be implemented using the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) approved and tested AES-256 encryption. Further details 
of the implementation are given in chapter 8. 
1.8. Final Test bench setup 
The following figure gives an overview of the high level final test bench setup which is given 
in more details in chapter 8. In this test bench various SCADA service commands were 
simulated and issued by FieldComm. These were encrypted and passed to the IP/MPLS core 
network to the desired destination router. The service commands will be decrypted and will 
be processed by the RTU.  
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Figure 1.3 IP/MPLS network with encryption performed within the network routers (Chego, 2014) 
1.9. Expected Outcomes 
Upon completion of the project, the expected outcome technically is that SCADA encryption 
would be implemented successfully; meaning information would be encrypted and decrypted 
successfully over a MPLS/IP core network. This success in encryption and decryption 
process should be achieved with minimal effect on the current SCADA services performance 
requirements. The key milestones undergone in order to achieve were as follows; complete a 
literature survey, compile a non-technical report section for the literature survey, then 
conduct the technical part (experiment) and complete the technical part of the report 
including results and analysis thereof. 
1.10.Conclusion  
The research project sought to determine whether using encryption in SCADA systems, the 
services performance requirements are still met in an OT IT environment over an IP/MPLS 
core network. The conclusion of this research question was achieved through various stages 
as discussed in the previous sections and this was compiled into the various chapters of this 
research project report. Chapter 2 will give a brief discussion on a typical SCADA system, its 
basic architecture and service requirements in Operational Technology Information 
Technology (OT/IT). Chapter 3 discusses OT/IT in general and the convergence principles 
thereof. Chapter 4 introduces the Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) Core networks. 
Chapter 5 discusses the encryption/decryption techniques. Chapter 6 comments on ethical 
hacking and vulnerability assessment in determining SCADA vulnerabilities and lists various 
SCADA vulnerabilities into several categories. From Chapter 7 onwards the focus is on the 
simulation experiment. Chapter 7 discusses the simulation experiment setup and 
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configuration. Chapter 8 gives the results of the simulation experiment and discusses them.  
Chapter 9 gives a summary of the results and also the research project with a brief discussion 
on recommendations for future work which can be continued further in this research field. 
The research report concludes with several appendices as supportive information for the 
research project. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2. Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition Systems 
(SCADA) 
2.1. Introduction  
This chapter gives an introduction of what SCADA is, how it works and briefly discusses the 
main components that make up the SCADA system particularly in utilities. The chapter also 
discusses the various SCADA performance requirements in an OT IT environment of which 
some of those services will be tested during the experiment work in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. 
2.2. What is SCADA 
SCADA systems are deployed in several industries including energy, transportation, traffic 
agencies, petroleum, telecommunications, and other processing facilities such as in food 
processing. They are the underlining control system for most of critical national 
infrastructures. The following figure 2.1 illustrates a typical SCADA system in utilities. 
 
Figure 2.1 An illustration of a typical electricity utility SCADA system (Anon., 2011) 
Initially when SCADA systems were implemented, security was not a major concern as the 
architecture was based on the fact that the network was totally isolated from other networks 
as most industrial networks were (Systems & Network Analysis Center, n.d.). SCADA 
systems have gone through an evolutionary process, from one generation to the next 
including from proprietary protocols to more open standard protocols. However the security 
of SCADA systems has not evolved at the rate that is acceptable to ensure acceptable levels 
of effective cyber security. This is alarming as SCADA systems control some of the critical 
infrastructure in a country and in industry. Many organizations, which have SCADA systems 
deployed, are not aware of SCADA vulnerabilities and most assume since SCADA systems 
are operating on an industrial network which until now operates independently from the 
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corporate network. The implications for SCADA failure are profound for an industry and a 
country. As aforementioned SCADA systems are deployed in utilities to control a country’s 
electricity infrastructure and if it fails the consequences are profound which can result in 
economic losses on proportional scales and loss of human life to mention a few. SCADA 
failure can also be used in modern warfare against a country where systematic attacks are 
executed against a nation’s critical infrastructure before the actual military strike commences. 
An enemy can sabotage the electricity infrastructure, the telecommunications infrastructure, 
banking, and water, basically everything controlled by SCADA to gain warfare advantage. 
This implies that SCADA failure has profound consequences for any country.  
There are many motivations that would fuel SCADA systems attacks, which include, 
industrial and international espionage, terrorism, strategic military attack on infrastructure, 
former employees seeking revenge, etc. (Thales, 2013).. This means for an organization or 
even a country, a form of security measure and strategy needs to be put in place to protect 
SCADA systems and consequently critical infrastructure. Cyber security for SCADA has to 
be viewed as a value chain and not only consider one aspect of it. The most common mistake 
is that encryption or any other part of the cyber security value chain can be treated in 
isolation and as an ultimate solution. However organizations sometimes fail to understand 
that encryption plays a critical part within the whole value chain but it is not the ultimate. The 
cyber security for SCADA must be considered as parts of a value chain with each link in the 
value chain to be robust as it is required to be. However for the purposes of this research 
project, the focus was on encryption part of the value chain.  
2.3. How SCADA works 
In utilities a SCADA system is a software application whereby data or information is 
acquired the electrical distribution systems with much of the information coming from 
substations (Terezinho, n.d.). Typically a substation will have a certain number of intelligent 
electronic devices and programmable logic controllers. Amongst other uses, these are used to 
measure, monitor and control a number of equipment within the substation in real time. The 
information from these devices is transmitted to the SCADA system and the SCADA system 
is also able to transmitted instructions to these substation based devices. This is done over a 
telecommunication’s transmission network.  This telecommunication transmission network 
can be one of a number of various mediums, such as fibre optic, microwave, GPRS, etc.   
2.4. Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) Main 
Components 
The following section gives a brief description of the key components of SCADA system 
used in utilities. 
2.4.1. Human Machine Interface 
The Human Machine Interface (HMI) is the user interface which users use when operating 
the SCADA system.  Data is processed by the SCADA software and it is displayed on the 
HMI graphical user interface screen which is then interpreted by the user to command 
appropriate actions. This means that the HMI also has controls, be it physical and software 
21 
 
based that the user or operator can manipulate. The HMI is also connected to the SCADA’s 
database systems and other servers, and it is also connected to Intelligent Electronic Devices 
(IED’s), Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC’s), the access network, the core network and 
other peripherals of the SCADA systems. This is so that the user can be able to provide 
statistics such as trends, be part of scheduled maintenance, diagnostic data, etc. The 
advantage of the HMI system is that the information about the SCADA is presented 
graphically in a manner which depicts the actual physical SCADA topology. The following 
figure gives an illustration of the SCADA HMI. 
 
Figure 2.2 An Illustration of a HMI screen for a utilities SCADA system (E&A Engineering Solutions, 
2014) 
2.4.2. Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition Protocols 
SCADA systems consist of protocols which are basically languages which allow the SCADA 
to be able to communicate with other components. These protocols in general are based on 
the International Standards Organization (ISO) standard which has several layers, typically 
seven layers. This is referred to as the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) standard. There 
are proprietary and non-proprietary protocols which SCADA uses and in recent times 
industry moved away from proprietary SCADA protocols to more open standard protocols 
(Kalapatapu, 2004). The typically open standard protocols used in SCADA are MODBUS, 
MODBUS X, Distributed Network Protocol (DNP), ASCII, IEC 61850 to mention a few. 
Some of these protocols are legacy protocols and are not preferred. Currently in utilities 
‘distribution environment DNP3 is commonly used with a move towards IEC61850. For the 
purposes of this experiment the SCADA simulator that is used, uses DNP3 protocol. 
2.4.3. Field Devices 
Field Devices include Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED’s), Programmable Logic 
Controllers (PLC’s), relays, etc. These are normally devices deployed in distributed fashion 
in different locations, or substations in the case of energy utilities. 
22 
 
2.4.4. Remote Terminal Unit  
Technically the Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) is a field device but because of its role and 
importance it is often discussed separately from other field devices. Several of the field 
devices such as the PLC’s IED’s and relays connect to the RTU which acts a gateway to 
facilitate communication between these devices and the SCADA system. 
2.4.5. Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition Communications 
Network 
A SCADA system usually comprises of a transport network, which can either be a switched 
telephone line, power line communication, radio or microwave, satellite, or even a packet 
switched network. In the case of the packet switched (IP/MPLS) network as the core, the 
SCADA system can be connected to it via an access network. The IP/MPLS core network is 
the focus of this research project and it is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 with the 
implementation done in chapter 8. The following figure gives an illustration of a SCADA 
MPLS/IP network and its components. The figure illustrates the access network, aggregation 
and the core network. 
 
Figure 2.3 An illustration of a typical SCADA MPLS/IP core network for a utility (Huawei, 2016) 
2.5. Performance requirements of SCADA systems in OT/IT 
Operational Technology Information Technology (OT/IT) SCADA Telecommunication 
Services requirements are listed below for various SCADA services.   
2.5.1. Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition Requirements 
SCADA link requirements are summarised as follows (Maritz & Bronkhorst, 2010): 
- A two 64 kbps SCADA link is required between each substation and the Energy 
Management System (EMS) at the National Control Centre (NCC)  
- A 64 kbps SCADA link is required between each substation and the System Control 
Computer (SCC) 
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- A 64 kbps SCADA link is required between each substation and the regional 
Distribution 
2.5.2. Management Station (DMS) 
- A DMS is a type of a SCADA system 
- DMSs require a 1 Mbps data link to the SCC 
- A 10 Mbps circuit is required for data replication between the NCC (EMS) the SCC 
- 1 Mbps links are required between the NCC and the regional TOCs, the Eskom 
2.5.3. Telecommunications Management Centre and Security Centre 
- SCADA links from substations to the DMS, EMS and SCC have a real requirement of 
64 kbps and an aspiration requirement of 1 Mbps 
- The SCADA links must be deterministic (Maritz & Bronkhorst, 2010). 
2.5.4. Future SCADA links will be configured to eliminate sub-
multiplexing. 
The 10 Mbps circuit between the NCC and the SCC will be IP-based. The aspiration 
requirement is to implement a 20 Mbps circuit. This could be through either two 10 Mbps or 
four 5 Mbps circuits. The individual circuits will terminate on different floors of the SCC. 
SCADA links will have a dual port requirement as per Figure below. The purpose is to 
provide redundancy at Bandwidth Management Equipment (BME) port level.  
The following Table 2.1 illustrates the service requirements for SCADA services which will 
be IP based on an MPLS network for a Distribution business. The table outlines or 
summarizes the various SCADA services and gives the various services’ bandwidth 
requirements, minimum latency and loss requirements. The table also gives the availability 
requirement of each service and also the level of priority each service is allocated. This 
means services with high or critical levels of priority, their performance requirements cannot 
be compromised at any cost. The table also gives an indication of whether encryption or 
security is required for each of the service or if security is vital. 
SCADA Service Bandwidth,  
Channel 
Latency, 
Loss 
Availability Service 
Priority 
Security 
Control Centre Voice 
services (Strategic 
Voice) 
64 kbps, IP Latency 
<150ms, 
Loss <1% 
98% Critical Optional 
Substation Condition 
Monitoring and post 
analysis 
512 kbps, 
IP 
Latency 
<200ms, 
Loss < 1% 
98% High Required 
Substation and Security 
Video Surveillances  
128 kbps 
per stream, 
IP 
Latency 
<150ms, 
Loss < 1% 
98,33% Medium Optional 
Telecontrol (11kv, 22kv, 
33kv, substations 
RTU’s) 
9 kbps, IP  Latency 
<300ms, 
Loss < 0.05% 
98,33% Critical Required 
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Telecontrol (11kv, 66kv, 
88kv, 132kv, substations 
RTU’s) 
19.2 kbps, 
IP  
Latency 
<300ms, 
Loss < 0.05% 
98,33% Critical Required 
Remote Metering 64kbps, IP Latency 
<300ms, 
Loss < 1% 
98,33% High Required 
Table 2.1 SCADA services performance’s minimum requirements (Maritz & Bronkhorst, 2010) 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the various components which make up the basic SCADA system 
architecture. Table 2.1 summarized the SCADA requirements in an OT/IT environment and 
categorized security requirements for those particular services as required or optional. For 
this research project simulation experiment, the ones categorized as required were simulated 
with results given in chapter 8 and the optional ones were not done as it was deemed not 
necessary. The following chapter discusses Operational Technology Information Technology. 
This is of importance since SCADA systems and the networks which they operate in are 
considered Operational Technology and the convergence between Operational Technology 
and Information Technology must be looked at since the IP/MPLS network is a packet 
switched network which is considered an Information Technology network in this context.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3. Operational Technology Information Technology (OT 
IT) 
This section discusses and gives a background into the Operational Technology Information 
Technology convergence, particularly within the context of utilities where SCADA is used as 
the industrial control system of which encryption thereof is discussed in this research thesis.  
3.1. What is OT/IT? 
Operational Technology has been a field of control and monitoring systems which previously 
was developed and supported by engineers who were responsible for maintaining the 
integrity and performance critical plants and networks (Groenewald, et al., 2012).  
In recent times and advancement of technology and the need for efficiency there has been a 
growing need to interface, collaboration and data exchange, not only between different OT 
systems but also IT systems. The trends in OT/IT have been such that the underlining 
platforms and technologies used in IT and OT are becoming similar, there is a level of 
standardization. There is also an increasing use of shared infrastructure. Furthermore there 
has been a move from proprietary, hardware-based systems particularly in OT to a more 
transparent and industry standardized software based technology. However this has brought 
in a new set of risks. This means an integrated OT/IT collaborative approach is required 
which is defined in the following sections. 
Information Technology is generally known however for the purposes of this discussion a 
definition is provided. IT refers to the comprehensive technology stack which covers both 
hardware and software used to manipulate data for a specific purpose (Atos, 2012). IT 
systems, particularly in legacy systems did not directly impact with the physical world in this 
context.  
OT/IT defines the interaction between Operational Technology and Information Technology 
as they converge together for better organizational performance in organizations which have 
implemented both. In a utility environment OT/IT convergence and integration brings 
together real time systems such as SCADA, EMS, DMS with corporate or enterprise 
applications that are IT based (Ventyx, n.d.). The following figure gives a demonstration of 
such integration for a utility’s two networks. 
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Figure 3.1 An illustration of OT/IT integration (Garg, 2013). 
The vulnerabilities of OT/IT are discussed in a section looking at SCADA vulnerabilities in 
an OT/IT environment in chapter 6. The vulnerabilities discussed are focused on the key 
research question and focus area of the research project. 
3.2. Governing Principles of OT/IT convergence 
There are some governing principles that need to be applied when the OT/IT integration is 
implemented. 
All Operational Technology requires following the engineering design, maintenance and 
operations review, quality and governance process as they would normal do and specified in 
their operational technology framework. This means that this would not change with the 
OT/IT integration. In terms of standards, both IT and OT will follow each of their specified 
standards with deviations more on the IT side as it has more flexibility than operational  
3.3. OT/IT Convergence Characteristics 
The following table summarizes convergence characteristics between Operational 
Technology and Information Technology. The table summarizes the individual characteristics 
of OT and IT and then both as a converged system. These characteristics are what need to be 
considered or taken into account when OT/IT integration or convergence takes place. It is 
important to understand IT characteristics and similarly OT characteristics before the 
integration and convergence. Finally it is equally important to understand the integrated or 
converged OT/IT characteristics.  
 Operational 
Technology (OT) 
Information 
Technology (IT) 
Converged OT/IT 
Role Manage, Monitor, 
Control physical Assets 
and industrial network 
equipment 
Process business 
transactions, provides 
communication, 
information, supports 
End to end solution, 
convergence 
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personnel 
Architecture Embedded 
hardware/Software 
Generic enterprise 
applications 
Common 
Information Model 
(CIM), MPLS Core 
Network 
Security NERC-CIP compliant Generic Enterprise 
Security – 
ISO27001/2 
Integrated Cyber 
Security Approach 
Interfaces Electromechanical, 
coded displays, 
customized GUI’s, 
computer based HMI 
Windows-Based 
GUI’s 
Converged OS GUI’s 
Connectivity Hardwired control 
networks (legacy 
networks), serial, non IP 
protocols, some may use 
IP as part of protocol 
stack. 
IP-based connectivity 
with significantly 
lower performance 
requirements except 
between data centers, 
video and voice 
applications 
Converged 
connectivity, pack 
switched protocols 
Operating 
Systems 
Embedded, Deterministic Non-Deterministic, 
e.g. MAC or 
Windows 
Shared of Converged 
OS 
Environment Typically deployed in 
rugged and has 
environments 
In office and thermo 
regulated 
environments 
Mixed as per need 
Type of Data Real time, time critical, 
near real time 
Non-real time, batch 
orientated data for 
enterprise systems, 
real-time for IP based 
voice, video, etc. 
For SCADA: real-
time, time critical 
and batch dependent 
on service command 
applied 
Ownership Technology Group 
(Engineers) 
IT group Group owned, jointly 
governed as per 
effective business 
model 
Usage Always online Some always online  Converged 
Service 
Provisioning 
Services usually cannot 
be outsourced due to the 
critical infrastructure 
needs 
Some services can be 
outsourced but all 
under IT group 
Core services should 
not be outsourced 
Consequence of 
Failure 
Possibly catastrophic 
with possible human life 
loss 
Productivity loss, 
transaction delays,  
Combination of both 
Business 
Continuity 
Core product mission 
critical systems and 
services 
Business processes 
critical support 
systems including its 
facilities and support 
systems 
End to end optimized 
operations 
Typical Systems 
Examples 
EMS, SCADA, 
Substation Automation, 
etc. 
SAP, Outlook, Web 
interfaces 
DMS, AMI, MDMS, 
MV90, etc. 
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Table 3.1 Characteristics of OT, IT and converged OT/IT (Groenewald, et al., 2012) 
3.4. Conclusion 
Chapter 3 discussed and defined OT IT, the basic governing principles of OT IT and lastly 
discussed the best practices and considerations for OT IT convergence in the context of a 
utility. The following chapter discusses the Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) network. 
This is done because the research question looks at the performance of SCADA services over 
an IP/MPLS core network with encryption implemented. Thus it is important to discuss the 
architecture, design and security requirements for such a network. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4. Multiprotocol Label Switching Core Network for 
SCADA 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) Core 
Network for SCADA systems. The discussion gives a brief introduction to MPLS, the basic 
architecture requirements in SCADA and also discussing its basic requirements for cyber 
security of which encryption (which is the focus area of this research project) is discussed. 
The chapter concludes by discussing briefly several cyber security techniques which can be 
used to secure the SCADA MPLS core network. 
4.1. Introduction 
A simple definition of Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) is a type of protocol which 
facilitates network traffic flow for faster routing. This is done by allowing packets to be 
moved at layer 2, which is the datalink layer instead of having to forward the frame to the 
layer 3, the network layer. This is done by each packet being labelled upon coming into the 
MPLS network by a router, this router is normally referred to by an ingress router (Rouse, 
2015). Then all the following routers simply do packet forwarding to the desired destination 
which is entirely determined by the labels attached by the ingress router. The following figure 
illustrates the basic functioning of a simple MPLS core network. 
 
Figure 4.1 A demonstration of the basic functioning of a MPLS network (Rouse, 2015) 
The destination label determines what route the packet will follow beforehand and this is 
referred to as the Label Switched Paths (LSP). This allows the MPLS architecture design to 
determine before what traffic will take which route which makes this network service aware 
and increases reliability and availability. For instance the routers can be configured to 
beforehand to determine which type of packets and from which address range must take this 
part. In chapter 8, for the experiment simulation part, the routers where configured to allow 
traffic only in a certain range of address to improve the level of security. Thus this 
predetermination of routes and address range not only improves security but also can improve 
the quality of supply such that service requirements (latency, packet loss, etc.) are met, as 
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defined in Table 2.1 for this research project because routers do not have to halt the process 
of forwarding packets so that they can go through routing tables.  
4.2. Multiprotocol Label Switching core Network Architecture 
The MPLS core network topology is determined by graphical mapping of the actual 
connections of routers and peripheral devices on the network (Alcatel Lucent, 2012). There 
are several topologies or architectures that can be followed when implementing an MPLS/IP 
core network and these include, a ring topology, a meshed or partially meshed, or a linear, 
hub, etc. For energy utilities it is recommend that ring architecture be used particularly if 
there would be access networks involved or used to access the MPLS core network as 
demonstrated by the proposed Eskom MPLS core network in Appendix A. The primary 
reason a ring topology is preferred it is because the architecture provides a level of efficiency, 
reliability and a level of redundancy such that traffic can be re-routed to different routes in 
cases of faults on the primary route. Another advantage of using ring architecture is that the 
feature of fast reroute in MPLS can be used such that traffic on the ring is not duplicated and 
as such ensure resiliency (Budka, 2014). This means that the bandwidth of the architecture 
can be efficiently used. The fast reroute feature in this architecture can reroute the traffic in 
below 50ms should there be a problem on the primary route. The following figure below 
gives an illustration of a whole energy utility MPLS/IP core network and various divisional 
services that can be provided over this core network through various access networks. As it 
can be viewed similarly to the proposed Eskom network in Appendix A, it is a ring core 
network with several access networks to the various divisional services points. 
 
Figure 4.2 An illustration of an Energy utility IP/MPLS core ring network with several divisional services 
access networks (Alcatel Lucent, 2012) 
For energy utilities the data packets are required to be able to propagate from the SCADA 
master control to the various locations within the network seamlessly. Furthermore the data 
packets are also required to be able to propagate amongst the various locations themselves 
and other networks such as the enterprise network for services such as remote substation 
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access through Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) network architecture. The other architecture 
requirement is that the IP/MPLS core must be seamlessly scalable to accommodate the 
growing number of sites especially in the energy distribution environment where the number 
of substations grows as the demand for electricity grows. The MPLS/IP core network for 
utilities must also be able to use high end scheduling processes to hierarchically place 
services as per their defined criticality as illustrated in Table 2.1. This means that services 
traffic will be fairly prioritized based on this criticality. This is often referred to as the 
virtualization of the MPLS/IP core network (Network Strategy Partners, 2009). This is 
achieved in the MPLS/IP core network through implementing the LSP service over certain 
virtual private network (VPN) process such as the circuit emulation service, virtual private 
LAN service (VPLS) and the Internet Protocol virtual private network (IPVPN) (Alcatel 
Lucent, 2012). These virtual private networks mentioned above can be used concurrently to 
carry different services and their specific LSP’s. This means that one kind of service traffic 
can be transmitted over an IPVPN while another service over VPLS as an example. Circuit 
Emulation Service is used within the IP/MPLS core network specifically for legacy services 
which are using the Time Division Multiplexing protocol. This service basically transforms 
the TDM data or serial data into an IP or packet switched data which can propagate over the 
IP/MPLS core network. The following figure gives a demonstration of the circuit emulation 
service implementation for legacy services.  
 
Figure 4.3 An illustration of the circuit emulation implemented in MPLS for legacy services (Alcatel-
Lucent, 2011) 
The virtual private LAN services basically reroutes packets based on their media access 
address (MAC) address. Both the source and the destination MAC address must be pre-
included in the MAC address table for all the routing paths. The internet protocol virtual 
private network (IPVPN) is used in MPLS/IP network for IP traffic only, meaning that the 
router forwarding is based solely on the IP address of the destination. For this research 
project, the simple IP/MPLS network architecture is based on both the Circuit Emulation 
services due to legacy equipment and the IPVPN service. This means the data from legacy 
SCADA system to the legacy RTU is encapsulated via an emulation and then transmitted 
over a predefined IPVPN MPLS core network which is encrypted. 
4.3. Basic Cyber Security Requirements for SCADA MPLS Core 
Network 
There is an inherent requirement for cyber security for SCADA over MPLS/IP core networks 
as it is a packet switched network which is connected to other networks such as access 
networks which might be connected to other networks which are connected to the internet. 
These cyber security requirements must also satisfy the SCADA cyber security value chain 
requirements and furthermore ensure that the SCADA services performance requirements are 
still met. This section discusses cyber security requirements that are specific to the MPLS 
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core network. The focus of this research project is encryption versus performance 
requirements, the other cyber security requirements are discussed to indicate where in the 
value chain encryption fits in and also to give a holistic view of the importance of each cyber 
security component in the value chain. These requirements are namely; address space and 
routing separation, hiding the network core structure, resistance to cyber intrusions, and 
spoofing prevention (CISCO MPLS, 2014). The address space and routing separation means 
that each end system would be assigned a distinctive IP address whereby all routes to this end 
system is acquired by this IP address. Hiding the core network topology means the 
architecture of the MPLS/IP network should not be easily deduced or seen from outside 
networks. This means the internal addressing and routing is hidden from the outside world 
and this can bring a level of security. However from a reliability, resilience and continuity 
point of view the addressing and routing must be properly documented. Resistance to attacks 
means that to some extend the MPLS/IP core network must be resistive to external attacks. 
Preventing spoofing refers to hiding the IP address within the core network and also hiding 
the LSP’s. This can be achieved through IPSec which was covered in chapter 8 for this 
research project as part of the experiment. 
4.4. Cyber Security Techniques for SCADA MPLS core Network 
This section discusses technique options that are available to secure the SCADA MPLS core 
network that gives high levels of security and ensures SCADA services performances 
requirements are met. Each of these are discussed to simply give an overview of where 
encryption is SCADA cyber security fall is within the value chain even though key focus area 
of the research project is only encryption. Herewith are the various techniques (Killalea, 
2000): 
4.4.1. Routing Authentication 
Routing information must be hidden and made confidential as it is a likely point to be 
attacked. The hidden routing information ensures that data from one router to the next comes 
from a router that the next router expects. This means all peer routers during configuration, 
the expected address ranges must be predefined for authentication purposes. Predefined 
authentication works best for static routing. For dynamic routing protocols in a case where 
the primary link fails and there is pre-authentication configuration there are ways of 
achieving that and still have a level of security. One option is to update the dynamic routing 
protocol table such that expected ranges of IP addresses are configured on the routers. The 
other alternative would be to use label distribution protocol authentication, discussed in 
section 4.4.4. Label distribution protocol authentication uses HASH algorithms to identify 
network routers to provide a level of authentication in dynamic routing such that foreign 
routers are not introduced in the network for attacking purposes. 
4.4.2. Access Control List 
Access control list refers to a list of permitted objects which are given access on a network. In 
this context it is referred to as packet filtering meaning all other information which is not 
permitted will be denied access. 
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4.4.3. Customer Edge and Provider Edge Routers 
This technique refers to when a utility’s network is also connected to an external service 
provider’s network. The customer edger router refers to the utility’s router and the provider 
edge router refers to the service provider’s router. The best configuration in this instance is to 
use static addresses which only allow traffic from this specific static address of the provider 
edge router.  
4.4.4. Label Distribution Protocol Authentication 
This technique refers to using hashing algorithms to authenticate routers and preventing 
attackers from introducing unauthentic routers. The hashing algorithms which can be used in 
this case are SHA-1 and MD5. MD5 however has in recent times been broken thus it is 
recommended that a SHA-1 algorithm is used. A detailed discussion on Hashing algorithm is 
given in Chapter 5 with experiment done in Chapter 8. 
4.4.5. Firewalling  
A firewall is essential for external connections and across different access networks and 
VPN’s connected to the MPLS core network to prevent attacks coming in from these 
connections. The firewalling principle in the context of utilities’ operational technology is 
illustrated in figure 4.2 above. 
4.4.6. Trusted Devices 
A list of trusted devices with their respective IP address can be added onto the routing tables 
such that only those addresses have access to the network. 
4.4.7. IPSec in MPLS networks 
More security to the IP/MPLS core network can be added by configuring IPSec on the core 
routers. IPSec should be configured with several of the following techniques to ensure 
optimal security (Shirley, 2000). 
4.4.7.1.  Authentication 
Authentication can be implemented on peer routers so that a foreign router is not used in an 
attack. The key for authentication can be pre-shared between the routers during each peer 
router configuration. 
4.4.7.2. Encryption 
In a case where an intruder is able to use packet sniffing techniques for instance to sniff the 
traffic in the network, encryption ensures that the attacker is not able to make any sense of the 
traffic. This means the integrity of the information is preserved. Encryption is discussed in 
much more detail in Chapter 5 and the implementation thereof is discussed in Chapter 8 with 
the results given in Chapter 9. 
4.4.7.3. Integrity of Packets 
This technique allows that any changes to the packets in the network be reported. 
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4.4.7.4. Replay Detection 
This technique is essential when an intruder has successfully been able to sniff packets and 
try to replay them at a later stage. This feature of IPSec will be able to detect this and prevent 
it. 
4.4.7.5. Point-to-Point 
The point-to-point feature is used between each peer router for static configuration of most of 
the IPSec features. It is advised that this feature be used for small core networks as it was 
done in this research project. It becomes difficult to use this especially in ever expanding 
network such as with increasing number of substations in utilities. 
4.5. Conclusion 
Chapter 4 discussed MPLS/IP core network, its design, architecture consideration and cyber 
security requirement. The security aspect as per the requirements which was implemented 
extensively for MPLS networks in this research experiment is the IPsec together with other 
techniques which focuses on encryption which is the key focus area of the research project. 
The following chapter discusses the various encryption/decryption techniques. It gives a 
background and gives a comparative analysis between the different schemes to lay the 
foundation in terms of the best suitable technique for implementation in the context of a 
utility. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5. Encryption and Decryption Techniques 
This section introduces and discusses encryption and decryption techniques.  
5.1. Introduction 
There are several questions that have to be asked with regards to encryption and decryption 
relating to the information that is to be encrypted and decrypted. These questions include how 
important and useful is that information, what is the cost to repair that information. 
Furthermore questions such as what is the cost or would it make a difference if this 
information is known by others to whom it is not intended or the information becomes 
available in the public domain. Further questions such as; is the information encrypted or 
decrypted valid and can the generator of the information be verified as the owner and that the 
information is authentic and comes from the so claimed owner. These questions are important 
and they normally inform what encryption techniques are suitable for use.  
5.2. Cryptography History 
As society developed, the need of securing information grew as result of societal aspects such 
as war throughout history that resulted in cryptographic schemes. This was apparent in many 
different cultures across the world (Khan, 1996). Cryptography can be seen in ancient Egypt 
with the use of Hieroglyphics as attributed to secrete communication between pharaohs and 
gods. Cryptography appeared also in ancient Greece with the use of a Scytale. A Scytale is 
made up of a cylinder with a strip parchment with a message on it (Leemburg, 1995). This 
parchment would have to be wind around the cylinder exactly the same way to be able to read 
the message. Spartans predominantly used this during times of war to execute military 
campaign through secure communications. The following figure below gives an example of 
Scytale.   
 
Figure 5.1 Ancient Greek's cryptographic Scytale (Leemburg, 1995) 
Ancient Rome also used cryptography for secure communication by replacing Roman letters 
with Greek letters; this was known as the Caesar Cipher. The Caesar cipher is illustrated in 
the following figure. 
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Figure 5.2 Illustration of Caesar Cipher (Adrian, 2014) 
In World War II a device called an Enigma Machine was designed by German engineer 
Arthur Scherbius which was basically an electron mechanical rotor cipher machine which 
performed multiple predetermined steps of substitution that were pre-set according to that 
particular’s day settings. This meant each day the settings would be changed. This was used 
for encrypted military operations communications. The following figure 5.3 gives an 
illustration of the Enigma Machine. The machine worked by basically changing a letter into 
another letter at each stage it passed through the machine (Dade, 2006). 
In today’s day and age, whole government departments are created towards cryptography to 
still try and ensure secure communications, all with the goal for availability, integrity and 
authenticity of the information exchanged. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 An Illustration of the internal operation of the Enigma Machine (Dade, 2006) 
5.3. Cryptography Basics 
The basic goal of cryptography or encryption is to protect the confidentiality of information 
in information systems. Cryptography is based on scrambling information such that it is 
completely random to anyone except those who know how to decrypt it. One of the key 
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challenges of cryptography is the appearance of the encrypted information as random. 
Another key factor in cryptography is a concept called plausible deniability which is a 
condition such that, a subject can “safely and believably deny any knowledge of any 
particular truth that may exist because no evidence of such truth’s existence can be proved” 
(Dr Ellefsen & Blauw, 2014). This means that a relatively good encrypted piece of 
information should look completely random such that it is indistinguishable from true random 
data and furthermore the deniability of the existence of decrypted data. This is the ultimate 
goal of a cryptographic system. The technical definition of cryptography is that cryptography 
is a way of encoding information such that an entity, being a person or machine is not able to 
easily or feasibly decode the encoded message without having knowledge of a key whereby 
this key is a large number which is not easily calculated. The reason for mentioning this 
technical definition is because it introduces the concept of a key which is essential in 
cryptographic schemes. 
5.4. Cryptography Systems  
A crypto system is made up of a combination of three elements; namely the algorithm used 
for encryption, the keying information (key) and the operational procedure. The encryption 
algorithm performs the actual encryption and decryption. All the other elements of a 
cryptography system depend on this algorithm. The Key is an algorithm that generates keys 
which will be used by the above mentioned encryption algorithm. The operational procedure 
basically states how all these parts of the encryption system functions together with one 
another to achieve the cryptographic goal. For example it will specify the type of input and 
output required by the encryption algorithm and how the key will be exchanged by parties 
involved in the cryptographic system.  
In today’s age, cryptography systems can be found in almost any computing systems, for 
instance, passwords and logons secure web transactions, communication devices, etc. 
Cryptographic systems are very widespread and available however still prove difficult in 
most instances to make them common. There are several reasons for this and these include 
the understanding of the technology. This means that cryptographic systems are not as 
intuitive and are difficult to understand especially for users who are not trained. The second 
reason is the sharing of secret information, which is an important issue with a cryptographic 
system to distribute and share the key. The other reason why cryptographic systems are not 
common is the issue of cost. Cryptography systems require a lot of money for research and 
development and they require a lot of time. Thus full packaged cryptographic systems can be 
very expensive for this reason. Lastly another common reason why these systems are not so 
common is that, at times it has specialized administrative requirements whereby a person 
requires specialized knowledge how to fully use the system, which introduces the element of 
training. One aspect of encryption that has to be considered is the process of deciphering the 
encrypted message without a key, which is normally known as Cryptanalysis. These are 
techniques used by intruders to compromise the system. They use three basic categories of 
cryptanalysis which will be discussed later in this chapter in much more detail. They use 
known plaintext and the ciphertext of a message to generate the key. Pattern recognition can 
be used starting with the common place of a message and try and find similarities and derive 
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a key. The last category is the use of a brute force approach attack. This is a trial and error 
method such that each and every possible combination of a key is tried until the correct key is 
generated. 
5.5. Basic Ciphers 
This section discusses basic ciphers which form part of the fundamentals of encryption 
schemes and techniques used even in today’s systems. 
5.5.1. Substitution Cipher 
The Substitution Cipher, otherwise known as a Caesar Cipher encodes information by 
substituting plaintext with other letters. The figure below illustrates an example of a basic 
substitution cipher. 
 
Figure 5.4 An illustration of a substitution cipher (Mat, 2009) 
5.5.2. Permutation Cipher 
The permutation cipher is also known as the transposition cipher whereby plaintext characters 
are moved according to a specified permutation formula. This is a basis of which some of the 
most advanced encryption schemes such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are based 
on. The following figure gives a simple illustration of a permutation cipher. 
 
Figure 5.5 A Permutation Cipher example (Shelton, 2014) 
5.5.3. Concealment Cipher 
The concealment cipher is basically hiding a message in plain site within other messages. In 
modern day age this technique is quite advanced with the use of steganography to hide other 
information in images and videos which will not be so clear to the human eye. The following 
figure gives an illustration of a concealment cipher. 
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Figure 5.6 An illustration of a concealment cipher (Dr Ellefsen & Blauw, 2014) 
5.6. Keying Information 
Keying information forms a critical part of a cryptography system. In Section 5.3, it is 
mentioned as one of the three components of a cryptography system. Keying information or a 
key in short, is a complex sequence of bits that is produced by an algorithm of which it is 
protected by a passcode and this key allows encryption and decryption to take place. The 
strongest forms of keys in cryptography systems have to be random in nature which means 
they must not be known by any other parties other than the ones involved. The issue of 
random was raised as an important aspect of encryption in previous section and there are only 
few sources of pure randomness in nature such as the movement of molecules, radioactive 
decay and biological mutations to name a few (Dr Ellefsen & Blauw, 2014). With computing 
systems it nearly impossible to achieve pure randomness meaning consequently the keys 
generated are not purely random as computer systems are deterministic by design. True 
randomness in computer systems would be extensively expensive. The best way to achieve 
randomness in computer systems is to implement a pseudorandom process, in this context a 
pseudorandom generator to generate keying information or keys. A pseudorandom number 
generator is not necessarily a truly random sequence but generates the same sequence each 
time but that sequence can be altered by what is referred to as a seed. These seeds can be 
generated from various sources that express a form of randomness, for instance in computing 
systems the current millisecond clock or the past several hundred keyboard keystrokes or 
mouse locations. This is how relatively random keys can be generated using a pseudorandom 
process. 
In cryptographic systems a relatively long key which is difficult to figure out is mostly 
desired as it makes the encryption code stronger. Thus the term keylength is important, which 
is a measure of the length of a key measure in amounts of bits making up that key. Keying 
information or keys introduces a difficult measure of security in cryptography systems which 
are how to keep the secret that only the vested parties know the key and still make sure the 
secrecy of the key is kept during exchange of the key between those two parties. There are 
common practices that can be implemented to ensure key secrecy such as using tokens to 
store the keys, encrypting the keys upon transporting them across networks for example and 
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keys being derived from passphrases. The other disadvantage about keys is that they are 
better when they are longer however rely on relatively short passcodes which human beings 
must be able to remember to protect these keys. This means the introduction of a human 
being in cryptographic system is the weakest link. The following figure gives a simple 
illustration of a key derivation function that summarizes the above discussion. 
 
Figure 5.7 A key derivation function from a passcode illustration (Jeff, 2012) 
5.7. Types of Encryption Schemes 
The strength of which a cryptography system provides depends on the strength of the 
algorithm implemented; however there must still be a balance between algorithm complexity 
and computational efficiency. This means it must encrypt and decrypt information with 
relative ease and reasonable time frame. The balance between these two factors makes it 
difficult for algorithms to be unbreakable, meaning some can be breakable especially with 
their reliance on keying information.  There are ways to make algorithms even less breakable; 
this is referred to as security obfuscation (Gebbie, 2002). This means that information about 
how the encryption of information was done must be kept secret.  
There are two main types of encryption techniques namely the symmetric encryption and 
asymmetric encryption schemes. Symmetric encryption is when the same key is used to 
encrypt and decrypt data. Furthermore symmetric encryption uses fixed scrambling 
operations. The key for symmetric encryption is measured in bits and depending on the level 
of encryption the number keys can be determined from that. 
If for example:  
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Thus if 56 bits are used for instance for encryption then the number of keys would be 
 = 2= 72, 058	 × 10   (5.3) 
Asymmetric encryption uses one key to encrypt and another to decrypt the data. The 
encryption key would generally be known by more than one source and it would be published 
and this is known as public key system. Asymmetric encryption uses prime numbers for 
encryption unlike symmetric encryption which uses complex scrambling. The following table 
gives a comparative analysis between the two schemes. 
Scheme Encryption Decryption Advantage Disadvantage 
Symmetric Same Key Same Key Fast and 
versatile 
Key distribution 
to both parties 
can compromise 
key. 
Asymmetric Public key Private key Different keys 
for encryption 
and decryption 
Slower to 
compute  
Table 5.1  A comparative analysis summary of symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes. 
Encryption schemes seek to achieve and ensure the protection of the integrity of messages, 
availability and confidentiality. Encryption schemes does not however solve problems 
introduced by access control onto systems, users who have access but are malicious, and also 
encrypting everything does not necessarily make information purely secure. Symmetric and 
Asymmetric encryption schemes are discussed in detail in the next sections respectively. 
5.8. Symmetric Encryption 
Symmetric encryption is categorized into two categories that have a goal to achieve 
confidentiality namely; Stream cipher and Block Cipher. The primary difference between 
these two is with regards to the amount of data or information they each encrypt at a time. 
Each of these schemes is discussed in the following sections respectively. Symmetric 
encryption schemes that achieves integrity and availability will be discussed later 
5.8.1. Stream Cipher: Confidentiality 
A stream cipher encrypts streams of data at a time, meaning it encrypts each bit of data at a 
time. The keying information requirement is that the key must be the same length or longer 
than the data being encrypted. This scheme is most suitable for continuous data streams of 
unknown length and size such as in a mobile telephony system and network connections such 
as SSL or TLS. Stream ciphers are relatively faster to compute but do not provide 
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information integrity. The following figure gives a simple illustration of a stream symmetric 
cipher implemented using a simple XOR gate. 
 
Figure 5.8 An illustration of a stream cipher (Lemke, 2014) 
One of the most commonly known and used stream ciphers is the Ron’s Cipher with a 
keylength of up to 2048 bits. It generates a pseudorandom stream of bits. It does this by 
generating 256 bytes in numerical order and swaps each byte with a byte dependent on each 
byte from the key (permutation). With each byte of data the swop happens again and the 
result is XORed with the plaintext. This scheme was very useful as it is fast but has a flaw 
that if the same key is used more than once the whole system is compromised. The RC4 
cipher is shown in the following figure below. 
 
Figure 5.9 A Ron's Cipher implementation 
5.8.2. Block Cipher: Confidentiality 
A Block Cipher encrypts information in chunks of data blocks. All blocks must be of the 
same size and length, and if there is not enough data to fill blocks random data is added to fill 
them up. There is a specific algorithm that generates these random data and it is referred to as 
a padding algorithm. The Block cipher is best suitable for encrypting determined file sizes 
such as documents. However this means that Block ciphers require more memory. There are 
several examples of block ciphers and these include the Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode 
Encryption. Each block of data encryption in ECB mode is independent of each other but 
uses the same key. This is a great flaw because if one breaks one block they can get the key 
and be able to decrypt the information. The following figures gives an illustration of both 
encryption and decryption modes of Electronic Codebook mode respectively (Gattol, 2015). 
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Figure 5.10  Electronic Codebook mode encryption (Brandsma, 2012) 
 
Figure 5.11  Electronic Codebook mode decryption (Brandsma, 2012) 
To solve the problem of using the same key and making the blocks independent, a Cipher 
Block Chaining mode encryption was introduced. This uses an initial vector of the same size 
as the plaintext which is XORed with the plaintext and input into the cipher with a key to 
generate the ciphertext. This generated ciphertext becomes the initial vector of the next block 
in a daisy chain format. This means that each block is dependent on the previous block and 
breaking one block does not necessarily mean all the blocks are broken. This encryption and 
decryption mode is illustrated in the following figures respectively (Gattol, 2015). 
 
Figure 5.12  Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption (Brandsma, 2012) 
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Figure 5.13  Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode decryption (Brandsma, 2012) 
One of the most commonly known block encryption implementations was the Data 
Encryption Standard (DES). When it was first introduced it used a key length of 56 bits 
whereby it is a relatively short length and was only able to encrypt a block length of 64 bits. 
Later it was developed to have a key length of 128 bits and be able to encrypt 128 bit long 
block of data. In 1997 DES was broken and was no longer the standard for encryption. To 
further try to make it more secure, a triple DES scheme was introduced whereby three 
separate keys were used in sequence. The first key was used to encrypt the data, the second 
key was used to decrypt the encrypted data and the third key was used to encrypt the data 
again. The computational efficiency of this scheme was compromised and it was not as 
secure. The following figure 5.14 gives an illustration of a simple DES algorithm 
implementation. 
DES encryption standard was replaced by the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). AES 
encryption encrypts blocks of 128 bits at a time and can use 128, 192 and 256 key length bits. 
It uses substitution permutation network which is quick to code the algorithm in software 
(Secretary of Commerce, 2001). The AES-128 encryption consists of 10 rounds of processing 
(Kak, 2014). The first step to be taken before processing can take place is that the input state 
array is XORed with first four words of the key which happens in the same manner during 
the decryption stage, whereby the last four words of the key is used instead. The encryption 
process steps include a single-byte based substitution step; it also includes a row permutation 
and a column mixing with the mixing of a round key. The 128 bit block of data that AES 
encrypts in a single round consists of a matrix of bytes, typically a 4 X 4 matrix. Each of the 
subsequent bytes of the 128 block occupies each of the columns of the matrix one after the 
other. This matrix is referred to as a state array (Niyaz, n.d.). This means each round of 
processing processes the input state array to produce an output state array. The output state 
array of the final round of processing is mixed into a 128 bit output block.  In terms of the 
decryption each round of processing is made up of the following stages, inverse and shifts the 
rows, then inverse and substitute bytes, then adds a round key and finally inverse and mixes 
the columns. This means that AES follows a very simple design that is easily implementable 
in modern hardware and still provides efficiency in performance. The following figure 5.15 
illustrates the AES structure for 10 rounds of processing for an encryption key that is 128 bits 
long. Both the encryption and the decryption side are illustrated in the figure below. AES-256 
encryption scheme which is implemented in this research project is an extension of the AES-
128 encryption scheme. 
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Figure 5.14  DES encryption algorithm illustration (Van Tilborg & Jajodia, 2011) 
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Figure 5.15 AES overall structure (Secretary of Commerce, 2001) 
5.8.3. Information Integrity 
Data Integrity refers to the safe keeping of information from alteration and manipulation by 
unauthorized parties. This means that it ensures that information has not been compromised 
and thus requires information to be verified. However verifying the integrity of information is 
no enough by itself because the information still has to be coming from an authentic party. 
Thus authentication and integrity goes hand in hand.  
Information integrity can be verified by implementing two techniques namely; Message 
Integrity Code (MIC) and Message Authentication Code (MAC). The Message Integrity 
Code is a string of bits which forms part of a message or information which verifies the 
integrity of a message. The Message Integrity Code is illustrated in the following figure 
below. 
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Figure 5.16  Message Integrity Code illustration (Oracle, 2010) 
The Message Authentication Code is also a string of data but it authenticates and verifies the 
integrity of a message using a key. The key can be generated using a symmetric block cipher 
or using a cryptographic hash function which will be discussed in the next section. The 
following figure shows a function of a Message authentication Code. 
 
Figure 5.17  Message Authentication Code illustration (Bernstein, n.d.) 
5.8.4. Cryptographic Hashing 
Cryptographic Hashing refers to a process of taking an amount of data, despite the size and 
returning a block of data that is of a fixed size. This output is referred to as a cryptographic 
hash value and the data that is being hashed is called the message or input. Cryptographic 
hash function must have the following attributes: 
- It must compute a hash digest for any input   
- It must be virtually impossible to determine the original message from the digest  
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- Any minute alteration on the message should completely change the digest or hash 
value  
- Finally it should be impossible to find two messages with the same digest.  
 
Cryptographic hashing can be used for password verification, pseudorandom number 
generation, file or data identification and file or data integrity by comparing the original 
hash value with the one generated by the transmitted or saved data. There are several 
examples of cryptographic hash algorithms such as the Message Digest 5 (MD5) which is a 
128 bit message digest. MD5 was broken in 2007. Another example is the Secure Hash 
Algorithm 1 (SHA1) which is a 160 bit message digest and the most recent the SHA-2 and 
SHA-3. 
5.9. Asymmetric Encryption 
The following section discusses Asymmetric encryption. 
5.9.1. Introduction 
Asymmetric encryption uses one key to encrypt and another to decrypt the data. The two keys 
are the private key which must be kept private and secrete at all times and the other key is a 
public key which can be distributed to anyone. These public keys and private keys go in pairs 
to create what is referred to as a public-private key pair. Public-Private key pairs are 
generated using very large prime numbers multiplied together. In asymmetric encryption, 
data that is encrypted using a public key can only be decrypted using a corresponding private 
key; the converse is true as well. Thus the public-private key in asymmetric encryption can be 
used to ensure authentication of where the information comes from as it would be encrypted 
by a public-private key pair combination. The primary reason why prime numbers are used to 
generate the public-private key pairs is that it very difficult to factorize very large prime 
numbers into the very same prime numbers that were used to create it to consequently get 
each of the public key and the private key. Thus the use of prime numbers in this context in 
cyber security is considered a Mathematical sinkhole whereby it creates a security system 
that is relatively robust and resistant to some attacks. One of the most commonly used 
asymmetric encryption would be the Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) encryption 
(Anonymous, 1999). It was created in the late 1970’s and became one of the most used 
asymmetric encryption scheme because of its ease of use and the use of very large prime 
numbers for public-private key pairs. RSA encrypts data using a symmetric encryption 
algorithm such as RC4 or AES. The symmetric key is encrypted with the recipient’s public 
key meaning only the recipient with their private key can be able to decrypt and get the 
symmetric key to decrypt the data. This is often referred to as end-to-end encryption. The 
following figure gives an illustration of RC4 encryption scheme. 
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Figure 5.18  RSA encryption scheme illustration (Lib4U, 2013) 
With reference to Table 5.1 above, one needs to know when to use asymmetric encryption 
and when to use symmetric encryption considering both advantages and disadvantages of 
both techniques. Thus one can use asymmetric encryption when encrypting small amounts of 
information as the amount of time will impact the performance. Secondly as aforementioned 
asymmetric encryption can be used when one wants to verify authenticity.  
5.9.2. Public Key Infrastructure 
Public key infrastructure (PKI) is an implementation created to give a holistic solution to 
digital identities, particularly to ensure authenticity in asymmetric encryption schemes. The 
public key infrastructure is based on the trust between a party and a certification authority, 
between a vendor and a certification authority and lastly between various certification 
authorities. Public key Infrastructure use digital certificates with encrypted public keys to 
authenticate users, furthermore to ensure integrity and ensure integrity and ensure non-
repudiation of users as discussed in Section 5.4. A public key infrastructure consist of 
hardware, software, policies and entities in a form of certificate authorities, digital 
certificates, computers and servers, certificate directories, and registration authorities. The 
public key infrastructure was intended to be a global system however the problem with that 
ideal is who would take responsibility for, funding and access to it, thus several authorities 
interacting with each other. The public key infrastructure can be fully implemented within a 
utility. 
5.10. Authentication Systems 
The following section discusses authentication systems. 
5.10.1. Secure Socket Layer 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) is used to encrypt network communication and forms part of 
using certificates and digital signatures for authenticity and integrity verification. Secure 
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Socket Layer uses keys exchange system and digital certificates to enable secure 
communication. IP secure and HTTPS uses secure socket layer. The following is a simple 
example of secure socket layer session implementation. 
 
Figure 5.19 A Secure Socket Layer session example (IdenTrust SSL, 2015) 
5.10.2. Secure Shell (SSH) 
Secure Shell is a means of communication between two computer systems that is secure. It 
utilizes passwords, usernames and digital certificates to create an encrypted path or tunnel 
between two computer systems. The advantage of SSH is that it can verify a party and who 
that part claims to be. SSH can be combined with many other authentication technologies to 
create a robust authentication system. This can be used in this context with remote terminal 
units. The weakest link in this system is still the human element in a form of very weak 
passwords. 
5.11. Virtual Private Networks (VPN) 
The following section discusses Virtual Private Networks which are essential in creating an 
MPLS core network for a SCADA system. 
5.11.1. Introduction 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) is virtual network that enables a party to securely connect to a 
particular network remotely. Virtual networks are designed or created on a combination of 
encryption techniques as discussed in the previous sections such as digital certificates which 
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are used to negotiate for session keys, symmetric encryption to encrypt the actual data or 
information and also an authentication mechanism to authenticate the user on accessing the 
network. The performance and connection of virtual private networks must be monitored 
particularly for time critical functions because some connections might be slow with the 
latency increase due to the multi-factor encryption techniques mentioned above. There are 
several virtual private network protocols and a few are discussed in the following sections. 
5.11.2. Point to Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) 
Point to Point Tunneling Protocol is a tunneling protocol and does not necessarily use 
encryption whereby encryption can be added as a separate layer. This was used in legacy 
Windows based operating systems equipment. This protocol does not provide much security. 
5.11.3. Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) 
Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol can be considered as an evolution from Point to Point Tunneling. 
Layer 2 Tunneling is capable of authenticating users and also has the ability to encrypt data 
and also compress it over a secure tunnel. What needs to be noted is that the data is one that 
is encrypted in tunnel and not the tunnel itself. 
5.11.4. Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) 
Internet Protocol Security it is a layer above the conventional protocols used for Internet. 
When the Internet and its protocol were first designed it was not done with security in mind, 
hence why IPSec was introduced later as a layer. IPSec can be used together with other 
various VPN solutions to provide robust security. IPSec can be used with either keys or 
digital certificates. For this research project IPSec was used as part of the MPLS network 
security with the encryption implemented within this design. More details are provided in 
chapter 4, 8 and 9. 
5.11.5. Open Virtual Private Network (OpenVPN) 
Open Virtual Private Network is an open source virtual private network solution which uses 
SSL/ TLS to create an encrypted tunnel.  
5.12. Conclusion 
Chapter 5 covered various encryption techniques and their basic functions in the context of 
the algorithm, the keying information and the governing operating principles for that 
particular scheme. It also covered the difference between symmetric and asymmetric 
encryption and how the two can be used in a system including advantages and disadvantages 
of each technique under these schemes. This literature led to the best implementation of 
encryption in the simulation experiment considering what was discussed in this chapter and 
also in Chapter 4. The following chapter discusses SCADA vulnerabilities by categorizing 
them into different sections. It also looks at how these are determined through basic ethical 
hacking process.  
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CHAPTER 6 
6. SCADA Systems Ethical Hacking and Vulnerability 
Assessment  
The following chapter discusses SCADA systems ethical hacking and vulnerability 
assessment techniques. The importance of ethical hacking and vulnerability assessment in 
this context is to ensure that vulnerabilities are identified before an attack occurs and are 
addressed accordingly, thus vulnerability assessment and ethical hacking is a preventative 
measure and a preparation measure before something happens. The actual lab experiment of 
SCADA ethical hacking and vulnerability assessment on an actual SCADA system is beyond 
the scope of this research project and hence was not conducted; however it is still important 
in this context to discuss the various vulnerabilities, vulnerability and ethical hacking process 
as given in this chapter. 
6.1. Ethical Hacking Overview 
Ethical Hacking is a process of performing penetration and security tests to determine 
vulnerabilities in computer systems (Van Der Haar & Leung, 2014). A hacker was initially 
defined as a “a person who enjoys learning the details of computer systems and how to 
stretch their capabilities as opposed to most users of computers who prefer to learn the bare 
minimum” (Palmer, 2001). There is a difference between security testing and penetration 
testing. Penetration is a process of getting into a computer system’s network to try and 
determine weaknesses whereas security testing goes further than breaking into computer 
systems’ networks but also includes the analysis of computer systems’ network security and 
policy as well. However in this discussion the two will be referred to in a generic form as 
penetration testers. The difference between normal hackers and ethical hackers is that even 
though they basically perform the same functions, they do so with different intentions and 
outcomes. Ethical hackers hack systems with the permission of system owners with the 
intention of identifying weaknesses but hackers do so with an intention of harm. 
Penetration Testers should have a form of certification from an accredited organization such 
as the SANS institute, Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP), etc. 
Beyond the accreditation, penetration testers and security testers must have technical skills 
and higher levels of insight into networks. Penetration testers use programming languages 
such as C, scripting and other collection of tools to perform penetration and security testing.  
There are basic models of penetration testing that are industry followed; namely the white 
box model, the black box model and the gray box model (Leung, et al., 2014). The white box 
model refers to a model whereby the penetration tester is given information about the 
computer systems, the network topology and technology on which he will be performing the 
penetration test. Also in this model the staff and personnel at that organization where the 
penetration and security test is performed, are informed about the penetration test.  
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The Black box model refers to a model whereby the penetration tester is not given 
information about the computer systems, the network topology and technology and also the 
staff and personnel of that organization are not informed about the test and the penetration 
tester is not permitted to consult or interview those staff. This means the penetration tester 
must figure out the network topology, technology and computer system. The last model is the 
Gray model whereby some information about the network topology and computer system is 
given to the penetration tester. This is also referred to as the Hybrid model (Leung, et al., 
2014). In any of these model a penetration tester must ensure that they perform the security 
test as per the agreement signed with the systems owner and also that everything done is legal 
using legal tools and that the process is documented. 
6.2. SCADA Vulnerability Assessment Process 
This section discusses in detail the process to be undertaken when performing the 
vulnerability assessment on a SCADA system. 
6.2.1. Assessment Planning 
In order to perform a security assessment and penetration testing a detailed plan must be 
formulated and be followed. The plan must include a time frame, costing, and objectives of 
the assessment, resources and tools requirements. The plan must also include the agreement 
contract the organization and tester including limitations of the test and also any non-
disclosure agreements (Idaho National Laboratory, 2011).  
6.2.2. Actual Testing and Assessment Process 
The assessment process focuses primarily on weaknesses that are common in various 
SCADA systems. SCADA assessments or penetration testing must be done on disconnected 
backup or development systems and not on live systems (Idaho National Laboratory, 2011). 
The vulnerability assessment must include the SCADA administrators, network 
administrators, penetration testers and security specialist, Information Technology Personnel 
and other Stakeholders, meaning that the SCADA penetration testing and vulnerability 
assessment is more likely to follow a white box or a grey box model as opposed to a black 
box model (Mell, et al., 2007). Hereto is the process: 
1. The first thing would be to compile the scope of work. This outlines the working contract 
which includes the goals of the assessment, the systems to be assessed, the equipment to 
be used, the team, cost, non-disclosure agreements, etc. 
2. The final scope of work is finalized as a collaborative input from both the assessment 
team and the system owner. 
3. The team can start with a full look at and understanding of the SCADA system deployed 
with the use of documentation and practical demonstration of the system. This will serve 
as learning and system understanding process for the team.  
4. The assessment equipment, hardware and software can be configured and calibrated and 
interfaced with system to be assessed. 
5. The actual penetration testing and vulnerability assessment can be conducted, with 
continuous documentation and categorization of the vulnerability using a scoring process  
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6. A draft final assessment report can be produced for the system owner (Permann & Rohde, 
2005). 
7. Compile the final report and report key learning areas which do not contravene the non-
disclosure agreement can be documented for public release. This is highly important not 
only for a national but also and international collaborative effort for cyber security for 
critical infrastructure. This is also discussed in more detail in chapter 10. 
6.3. SCADA Vulnerabilities in a OT/IT Environment 
The following section presents the high level common SCADA vulnerabilities which can be 
identified using the processes and plan outlined in the previous sections. 
6.3.1. Network Attacks 
The follow discusses Network attacks 
6.3.1.1. Denial of Service Attack (DoS) 
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack prohibits authentic users from using and gaining access to 
network infrastructure. 
6.3.1.2. Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDoS) 
A Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDoS) is an attack similar to the DoS attack, 
however the attack uses a number of attack computers or servers such that the attack is not 
from one source but distributed. This means that in a packet switched network, the network 
could be flooded with a great number of packets which results in loss of bandwidth.  
6.3.1.3. Buffer Overflow Attack 
This type of attack exploits code that is written in poor fashion, for example a code that 
doesn’t check or verify the amount of memory utilized by code. In this type of attack the 
attacker would write a program that overflows the memory buffer in operating system 
consequently would result in the attacker gaining access as an administrator. 
6.3.1.4. Ping of Death Attack 
The Ping of Death Attack is when an attacker creates a large ICMP packet in the IP 
addressing header more than the allowable 65 kilobytes which results in a crash of the 
destination pointer which cannot process the large ICMP packet. 
6.3.1.5. Session Hijacking  
This type of attack is when an attacker joins a TCP/IP session and creates an impression to 
both authentic parties that the other party is communicating with the other authentic party 
meanwhile it is the attacker. 
6.3.2. Attacks on Encryption Systems 
This section discussed general and common attacks on encryption systems. There are several 
reasons why encryption systems would be attacked and these include; accessing the 
information, to get access to that network, perhaps to do an investigation or as an information 
recovery process to mention a few. As mentioned in Section 5.4 and 5.6 the strength of an 
encryption mostly lies in the strength or complexity of the keying information however this 
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does not guarantee that attacks on a system will not be effective, however it can make 
difficult or even impossible. Hereto discussed are several encryption systems attacks.  
6.3.2.1. Man-in-the-Middle Attack (MITM) 
The Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack is when an attacker eavesdrops or listens to an 
encrypted communication channel and try to decrypt that information. It is a very popular 
type of an attack. 
6.3.2.2. Timing Attacks 
The timing attack considers and checks how long or the amount of time it takes to encrypt 
and decrypt information which is then used to figure how long is the key and what the key is. 
It is a difficult type of attack to perform which is why it is not as popular.  
6.3.2.3. Brute-force Attack 
The brute force attack tries each and every combination possible for passwords until the 
correct one is found. This is very time consuming though, although there are advanced brute-
force attack systems which start with most common possible password for a key. 
6.3.2.4. Rainbow Tables 
This is an effective type of attack whereby the hash function is attacked by using extremely 
large pre-computed tables to quickly figure out hashes of passwords. These pre-computed 
tables can even be bought online. 
6.3.2.5. Birthday Attack  
Attackers use this attack to Hash functions (section 5.8.4) to force the hash function to 
generate the same output for different inputs.  
6.3.2.6. Chosen Ciphertext and Plaintext Attacks 
This is a reverse engineering attack whereby the attacker would use the ciphertext and 
plaintext to try and reverse engineer the algorithm or the encryption key. 
6.3.2.7. Port Scanning Attacks 
Port Scanning attempts to discover which services a host computer is rendering and identifies 
that as vulnerabilities. Port scanning would report on all closed ports, open ports, filtered 
ports and also determine the services running on those ports and also the operating system. 
There are different types of port scans namely;  
- SYN scan which is a subtle port scan,  
- ACK scan which normally used to get through firewalls,  
- XMAS scan whereby different flags are altered,  
- Connect scan which completes the required three way handshake. 
6.3.3. Physical Access Attacks 
Physical Access Attacks refers to physical security vulnerabilities in the physical access 
control system which may result to cyber security attack. This is extremely important because 
not only is it a possible flaw in modern industrial networks but also in legacy industrial 
networks which were designed to be isolated as a security measure. Now if an attacker is 
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somehow able to gain access onto the SCADA system’s infrastructure using physical means 
this can result in a cyber-attack. The other reason why physical security is important is that an 
attack is more likely to happen inside than externally (Leung, et al., 2014).  Physical access 
attacks include the following: 
6.3.3.1. Physical Access Control  
This is the actual physical access to the infrastructure. Most infrastructure premises use 
deadbolt locks which an average person can pick seamlessly. The other flaw in access control 
is that most premises do not keep proper records of individuals accessing the infrastructure 
premises. Some premises utilize magnetic strip access cards which can easily be lost, stolen, 
or even duplicated with ease. This will be demonstrated even further under social engineering 
attacks. 
6.3.3.2. Key loggers 
Physical key loggers can be inserted onto unsuspecting user’s computers to capture every key 
strokes of a keyboard and can later be retrieved to gain critical information such as 
passwords. 
6.3.3.3. Footprinting 
Footprinting is a method of acquiring information about a network, in this case an industrial 
network in order to be able to gain access onto that network. Weaknesses in the network are 
identified which can be exploited. Several methods of Footprinting are available such as 
email, using HTTP basics and other web tools. 
6.3.4. Social Engineering Attacks 
The human element is always the weakest link in cyber security and that is why one of the 
most effective methods of initiating cyber attackers begins with a social engineering attack. A 
social engineering attack extracts important information through persuasion, intimidation, 
coercion, urgency, kindness, position of authority, etc. (Leung, et al., 2014). This attack is 
harder to protect against as it involves human behavior. It is hypothesized that if the human 
element is completely removed there would be a great improvement in cyber security. 
Several techniques are used to instigate a social engineering attack such as; 
6.3.4.1. Shoulder Surfing 
This attack refers to when a potential attackers reads what a user enters on their keyboard. 
6.3.4.2. Dumpster Diving 
An attacker goes through trash in order to obtain useful information which can be used with 
other useful information obtained in other means. The information in the trash can include, 
passwords on sticky notes, calendars and schedules, resumes, utility bills, financial reports, 
directories and telephone numbers, etc. 
6.3.4.3. Piggybacking or tailgating  
This attack is attempting to gain access onto a restricted area by using the human element of 
kindness, by tailgating authorized personnel entering that restricted area. 
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6.3.4.4. Phishing 
Phishing can be done through various means including emails. For instance a user can get an 
email about a sick baby and through compassion they can open attachments which may result 
in an intrusion. 
6.3.5. Operating Systems Vulnerabilities 
There are several vulnerabilities which can be exploited within an operating system. Since 
most SCADA systems run on Windows based machines, this section will discuss briefly 
Windows based operating system vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are as follows: 
6.3.5.1. New Technology File System (NTFS) 
A File system can be vulnerable, particularly the New Technology File System (NTFS) 
because of its inherent feature of being able to hide information behind existing files without 
affecting the function and size of the other information (Buttner, 2008).  
6.3.5.2. File Allocation Table 
The biggest problem about a Windows based file allocation table is that it does not allow for 
an access control list (ACL) at the individual file level. The ACL is important for 
administering permissions on files particularly in a multi-user environment (Leung, et al., 
2014). 
6.3.5.3. Remote Procedure Cell 
This is another great vulnerability as this remote procedure cell allows software running on 
one host to be run as code on another remote host. 
6.3.5.4. Structure Query Language (SQL) Server 
The most common vulnerabilities in SQL servers environment of which some SCADA 
systems uses as form of its databases is the human element where by system administrator 
accounts have no passwords or the username and password are left default. This would give 
administrative rights to an intruder if access is gained. 
6.3.5.5. Passwords and Authentication 
The issue about passwords as mentioned in encryption discussion in the section above is the 
human factor element whereby a user must select a password they can remember. This results 
in very weak passwords, which can be cracked using social engineering techniques and also 
computing techniques. 
6.3.6. Legislative constraints 
The legislative constraints are another big issue in SCADA and can be considered as 
vulnerability on a generic basis that most of our laws are not able to keep up with the rate at 
which technology is changing. The second legislative constraint not only in the context of 
SCADA systems cyber security is the issue of jurisdiction, whereby it is difficult to arrest and 
persecute a criminal should an attack be coming from another country. Another issues is that 
with regards to digital evidence to be obtained, a warrant is required especially if the property 
of the suspected perpetrator is to be analysed. The bureaucratic process of this can 
compromise the time required to obtain digital evidence without the perpetrator getting the 
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opportunity to alter the state of that evidence. The other challenge with obtaining a warrant is 
the difficulty of demonstrating probable cause. Thus legislative constraints can be deemed as 
vulnerabilities. 
6.4. Conclusion 
Chapter 6 discussed the vulnerabilities in SCADA systems. It categorized them into network, 
encryption, physical, social engineering, operating system and legislative vulnerabilities each 
with details of specific attacks. The chapter also discussed the process which can be followed 
under ethical hacking to determine these vulnerabilities. Chapter 6 concludes the non-
technical component of this research project. Chapter 7 onwards discusses the actual 
simulation experiment. It gives the simulation experiment setup and configuration. 
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CHAPTER 7 
7. Lab experiment and simulation setup and configuration 
This chapter gives the overall description of the experiment and simulation performed. In 
Section 7.1 it introduces the experiment’s objective, scope and area of focus. In Section 7.2 it 
briefly gives the experiment equipment and tools required and discuss in Section 7.3 the 
SCADA services that we simulated during the experiment. In   Section 7.4 the lab experiment 
and simulation setup overview is given. Section 7.5 discusses the MPLS/IP network design 
and configuration including the encryption. The last section discusses how the SCADA and 
RTU was setup and calibrated. 
7.1. Experiment Objective 
The key research question for this project is “whether using encryption in SCADA systems, 
the services performance requirements are still met in OT IT environment over an MPLS core 
network”? The core focus area of the research project was to determine if Encryption is used, 
will SCADA performance requirements still be met. This means that the research project 
specifically focuses on the Encryption, which is a single component of the whole security 
value chain, versus SCADA services performance requirements over packet switched 
network. This means that the experiment will solely focus on the encryption portion and not 
any other part of the cyber security value chain pertaining to SCADA cyber security. Other 
aspects of the SCADA cyber security value chain are outside the scope of this research 
project and can be considered as future work or other areas of research. The experiment was 
to determine the three main aspects of encryption which are integrity, availability and 
confidentiality if they are met as discussed in Chapter 1 and ensures that SCADA service 
requirements are also met. The experiment design and setup will ensure that encryption meets 
the requirements of integrity, confidentiality and availability over a packet switched network 
(MPLS/IP network). Furthermore, SCADA services will be tested over this encrypted 
MPLS/IP network to determine if the service performance requirements as per Table 2.1 are 
met. The key performance measure and indicator of testing the hypothesis will be the overall 
latency of each SCADA service experienced over the encrypted MPLS/IP network compared 
to the basic required one as per Table 2.1. This means that if the latencies experiences by 
these services are lower than the ones specified as basic performance requirements then the 
experiments would have been successful and the converse would be mean they were not 
successful. Another key performance measure will be availability requirements of SCADA 
services as per Table 2.1. If the availability is higher than stipulated in Table 2.1 then the 
experiment was a successful and the converse would be true. The integrity and confidentiality 
aspects of the encryption was achieved during the design and configuration given in section 
7.5 with the results discussed in Chapter 9. 
7.2. Lab experiment equipment and tools used 
The following equipment and tools were required for the successful completion of the lab and 
simulation experiment. 
- 1x HP laptop: Running the SCADA Simulator and Serial/TCP conversion platform 
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- 1x Toshiba laptop: Running the GNS3(IP/MPLS core network), Loop-back network, 
TCP/IP to Serial conversion 
- 1x RS232 RTU 120ohm’s  cable 
- GNS3: IP/MPLS core network simulator 
- Enterprise IOS installed in GNS3 for CISCO routers (incl. Security Modules) 
- Com By TCP (TCP/IP-Serial Converter) 
- Serial/IP Control Panel (Serial-TCP/IP Converter) 
- IST Talus ERTU (Enhanced Remote Terminal Unit) 
- ERT1-13800 Dual Isolated RS-232 Card 
- SCADA Simulator: FieldComm 
- 1x MacBook Pro Laptop  
- NETGEAR Local Area Network Switch 
7.3. Description of simulated SCADA services 
The following SCADA services were simulated during the experiment to measure if their 
performance requirements are met when their signals are transmitted over an encrypted 
MPLS/IP core network. This meant each of the SCADA service signals had to be received 
and executed by the RTU within the acceptable time period as per that particular service’s 
performance requirement. The time period include all latencies such as the propagation time, 
encryption and decryption time and other latencies which were supposed to be within a 
certain acceptable period of time. This means that latency was a key measure of performance 
as discussed in the introduction and as given in table 2.1. Hereto are the main SCADA 
services; 
7.3.1. Telecontrol 
Telecontrol in FieldComm (SCADA simulator) was represented by two modes of messages 
which are Direct Operate and Operate. For Direct Operate mode the instructions that were 
sent to the RTU via the encrypted MPLS/IP core network are, close, trip and null which all 
three operate a substation relay that is normally connected to the RTU. Similarly, for Operate 
mode, the instructions that were sent through the encrypted MPLS/IP network are close and 
trip. 
7.3.2. Substation Condition  
The substation condition for this experiment was represented by using sending an integrity 
poll message, sending a cold restart message and sending a warm restart message as the RTU 
used was relatively old and does not offer other substation condition messages. 
7.3.3. Remote Monitoring/Metering 
At the time of the experiment there was no metering equipment connected to the RTU thus 
the monitoring/metering function was simulated using the “Read and Write” functions. This 
suffices as it a function of getting information from the IED through the RTU. The function 
used to represent the monitoring is “read date and time”. A time stamp was read from the 
RTU to represent the acquisition of information such as metering. The other function used 
was the “write date and time”. If the performance requirements for these functions were 
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satisfactory then it can be extrapolated that they are satisfactory for reading metering and 
monitoring information. 
7.3.4. RTU Error Statistics 
RTU error statistics is list of errors encountered when the SCADA simulator (FieldComm) 
communicates with the RTU, in this case over the encrypted MPLS/IP network. This error 
report will be generated and used as a measure to determine the level of availability of the 
encrypted MPLS/IP core network and the ability of the SCADA services message to 
propagate through this network without many issues.  Availability is an integral part of 
encryption, which are confidentiality, integrity and availability. The following error types are 
measured: 
- Bad CRC:  counted when a bad CRC is received from the RTU.  
- User Data Overflow: SCADA (FieldComm) allows the application layer fragments to 
be 2048 bytes and if this is exceeded  by a slave (RTU) then it is counted as an error. 
- Sequence Errors: this error is counted when a Transport layer sequence number 
arrives not in the correct sequence from the RTU 
- Confirm Retries: this error is when SCADA performs a Link Layer Retry after an 
initial Timeout 
- Confirm Failure: This error is incremented after the pre-determined number of retries 
is exceeded without success and SCADA fails the link transmission. 
- AL No Responses: This refers to errors whenever no response is received to a request 
within the configured Application Layer Response Timeout. 
7.4. Lab experiment and simulation setup overview 
The overview of the Lab experiment simulation setup is as follows. 
- A HP laptop was connected to a NETGEAR network Switch. 
- A Toshiba laptop was connected to the HP laptop also via the NETGEAR network 
switch. 
- The Switch was also connected to the Eskom Enterprise network. 
- The Toshiba laptop was connected to the RTU via the RS232 cable. 
- IP addresses assignment. The IP addresses assignment for each interface, Ethernet 
card, emulator and any other devices in this simulation experiment had to ensure they 
were within the same subnet to ensure correct routing. 
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Figure 7.1 Experiment and Simulation block diagram 
The following various images are illustrating the actual experimental setup.  
 
Figure 7.2  Illustration of a D20 RTU and the IST ERTU used for the simulation and experiment 
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Figure 7.3 The Toshiba laptop running the MPLS/IP core network on GNS3 simulator, TCP/IP-RS232 
conversion and it is connected to the RTU via RS232 
 
Figure 7.4 The HP laptop running the SCADA simulator and RS232-TCP/IP conversion which transmits 
the data to the Toshiba laptop's GNS3 network via a network switch 
 
Figure 7.5 An illustration of the switch and the MacBook Laptop connected to generate traffic and to try 
and send messages to the network 
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Figure 7.6 An overview of the overall simulation and experiment setup 
The functional process for the experimental setup and simulation was as follows. 
- The HP Laptop was running the SCADA Simulator (FieldComm) terminating the 
SCADA services messages out of a COM port.  
- The SCADA services messages were then encapsulated into a TCP/IP data stream 
using a RS232- TCP conversion emulator. The IP Address for the HP laptop was 
192.168.0.2 
- The Emulator was configured as a client accepting data from the SCADA COM port 
and encapsulating it and transmitting it through the Ethernet card via a LAN network 
through the network Ethernet switch/router to Toshiba Laptop with IP 
Address192.168.0.3. 
- The LAN network of the Toshiba was connected to the GNS3’s IP/MLPS core 
network as per GNS3 external LAN configuration. 
- The new transmitted encapsulated TCP/IP SCADA services messages were then 
encrypted using the AES 256 encryption standard and transmitted over the GNS3’s 
IP/MPLS core network. 
- The data was then decrypted after propagation through the virtual IP/MPLS core 
network in GNS3, on the exiting interface of the router connected to a loopback 
facility. 
- The loopback network was used to re-route the data internally to the laptop to be able 
to convert it back to RS-232 before sending it to the RTU. 
- The data from the loopback was send to the TCP/IP-RS232 conversion emulator and 
it was converted to RS232 format removing the TCP/IP encapsulation. 
- The data was then sent through COM1 port of the Toshiba laptop to the RTU for 
SCADA services messages execution by the RTU. 
- The RTU would execute the service messages and gave responses or feedback. The 
responses from the RTU back to the SCADA simulator would go through the same 
process in reverse.  
The following figure 8.7 gives an illustration of the experiment test set-up bench.  
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Figure 7.7 Functional block diagram for the lab experiment and simulation 
7.5. MPLS/IP core network design and configuration 
This section discusses the MPLS/IP core network setup and routers configuration including 
the AES-256 encryption and decryption.  
66 
 
7.5.1. Basic Network design and Router Configuration 
The basic router configuration in GNS3 after the successful installation and initialization of 
GNS3 involved for each router configuring the various terminals to be used. Since the routers 
were connected to an external network, they needed to be configured as such. To be able to 
convert the information from TCP/IP back to RS-232 for the RTU to be able to process, a 
loopback configuration was used to re-route the data from the GNS3 IP/MPLS core network 
back into the Toshiba laptop (host) such that the TCP/IP-RS232 emulator can be able to 
facilitate the conversion. Herewith is the configuration of the routers. 
- Firstly the various interfaces of the routers were configured, with Router 1 connected 
to Router 2. The other interface of Router 1 was connected to the Local Area Network 
interface card of the Toshiba Laptop which was connected to a switch connecting 
other devices and other networks such as the Eskom Network in this case. The other 
interface of Router 2 was connected to the loopback network to be able to convert the 
information back to RS-232 for processing by the RTU as discussed above. The other 
interfaces of Router 1 and 2 were connected to other routers to complete the IP/MPLS 
core network. 
- The interfaces were configured as Fast Ethernet and were assigned as discussed 
above. 
- The next phase involved navigating to the global configuration mode of the routers. 
- Then the IP CEF mode was configured 
- The IP domain look-up was configured 
- The Router Rip version was assigned, version 2 in this case 
- The network was assigned. This means only devices in a particular range of IP 
addresses can have access or be part of this network. This is an additional security 
feature/ layer as recommended for an IP/MPLS core network in Chapter 4.  
- The next step involves configuring the IP Addresses of all the interfaces, each 
interface at a time. 
- Assign the duplex mode 
- Assigned the speed 
- Then activate the fastEthernet interfaces 
- Then verify the configuration (shown in the results section in Chapter 8) 
The loopback allowed GNS3 to connect to the host computer and it was configured as 
follows. 
- Firstly the loopback adapter had to be created by adding legacy hardware in Microsoft 
Device Manager. 
- The next step involved configuring the loopback adapter, assigning the correct IP 
Address and Subnet in the range according to the network the MPLS/IP core network 
fell into. 
- The next stage was connecting the loopback network onto the GNS3 MPLS/IP core 
network which was a simple matter of configuring the interface of the correct router 
and selecting this loopback adapter as it appears under a list of all networks available. 
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The following figure gives an illustration of the basic simulated IP/MPLS core network 
connected to a LAN on periphery and to a loopback (consequently to the emulator and a 
RTU) access networks on the other end.  
 
Figure 7.8 An illustration of an IP/MPLS core network connected to two access networks (LAN and 
Loopback) 
The following figure gives an illustration of the complete connection, particularly what is 
happening within the clouds as illustrated in the figure above. 
Figure 7.9 The GNS3 network connected to SCADA and the RTU through the access networks (LAN and 
Loopback) illustration 
The full configuration of the routers is given in Appendix B 
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7.5.2. AES 256 Encryption in the MPLS/IP network 
This section discussed how the encryption was configured onto the MPLS/IP core network 
configured above. The method of encryption chosen to be used for this research project was 
the symmetric Advanced Encryption Standard (hereto, AES) encryption standard, particularly 
the AES-256 using the IPSEC tunnelling mode. The 256 in AES simply refers to the number 
of bits of the key used as discussed in Chapter 5. This section discusses the logical steps 
undergone to configure the routers on the periphery of the network for encryption and 
decryption. This configuration process was based on the basic router configuration process 
from the above Section 7.3.1. The process is as discussed in detail in the following steps. 
1. The first thing that needed to be done after entering the config mode was to enable the 
isakmp. Then after the enablement, choose a policy standard that would be used, in 
this case policy 10 was chosen. The policy is needed because the simulated router 
initially attempts a connection in a particular mode.  
2. The next thing was to configure the mode used for authentication. For a substation 
environment and based on literature survey as discussed in Chapter 5 the best option 
was to use a pre-shared key (PSK).  
3. The next step involved enabling the Hash method, which in this case SHA was used. 
The other mode is MD5 but as discussed in chapter 5, SHA is much better than MD5.  
4. The following step involved the configuration of the encryption algorithm. There are 
various different algorithms which can be configured depending on strength and use.  
In this environment it is important to strike a balance between performance and 
strength of the encryption algorithm. As discussed above the Advanced Encryption 
Standard-256 (AES-256) was configured.  
5. The following step involved the enablement of the Group which configure the 
modulus size of the Diffe-Hellman key Exchange (Moonie, 2011). The group used for 
this configuration is Group 5 which is the 1536-bit Diffie-Hellman group. Then 
subsequent to this was to configure the lifetime which is the time measured in seconds 
for security association, for this configuration the maximum which is 86400 was 
configured which is the default.  
6. The next step was to configure the IPSEC tunnel mode using the 256 bit AES and 
SHA. 
7. Then the next step involved the defining the traffic that was to be secured via the 
encrypted channel. 
8. The next step was to configure the range of IP on the other side or periphery also 
matching the above defined traffic to the other router in the periphery and configuring 
the transform set to be used. 
9. The next step was to assign the configured crypto map to the outgoing interface. 
10. The last step involved the testing and verification of this configuration. 
The full code for configuration is given as part of Appendix B. 
7.6. SCADA and RTU simulation set-up calibration 
This section discusses the RTU and SCADA set-up. 
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7.6.1. Routers configuration calibration  
This initial set-up involved connecting the routers back to back with a direct link between the 
two routers. A ping command was used to ping the X21 and the interfaces to determine if 
there was communication between the two routers and that the configuration was done 
properly. If the ping was successful then it would have implied that the configuration was 
successful. This calibration set-up is illustrated in the figure below. 
7.6.2. SCADA (FieldComm) Configuration 
Herewith is the configuration of the SCADA. The SCADA in this case uses Serial 
communication, which will be converted to packet switched. The channel used for the Master 
is COM1 and Channel B uses COM3, with the baud rate of 9600 kbps, data length 8 bits, 1 
stop bit and no parity. The above configuration is given in the screen shot in the following 
figure. 
 
Figure 7.10 An illustration of SCADA (FieldComm) configuration for serial communication 
The address of this SCADA station is assigned to 3, meaning RTU configured to recognize 
Master station 3 will only communicate with Master or SCADA with address 3. An 
intermesssage delay of 20ms is assigned. The maximum number of RTU’s which can be can 
be connected to this master station of SCADA is 100. The other settings are left as default. 
The following figures give an illustration of the further SCADA configuration. 
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Figure 7.11 An illustration of SCADA settings with the Address of the SCADA 
 
Figure 7.12 SCADA settings configuration continued 
7.6.3. RTU Configuration 
The following section discusses the configuration for the Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) 
within the SCADA module or application. The address assigned to this RTU is 1234 and an 
E-RTU for the purposes of this lab experiment was used. The response Timeout is assigned to 
be 200ms, meaning if messages are sent and delay for more than 200ms the request will time 
out. Polling the RTU was also enabled to allow the SCADA to poll the RTU with the poll 
interval assigned as 1s. This constant polling of the RTU after 1s was essential for constantly 
generating traffic to the RTU.  
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Figure 7.13 An Illustration of RTU settings configuration 
The commands sent from the SCADA to the RTU are referred to as messages. These 
messages basically perform various functions to achieve various goals such as Telecontrol, 
substation condition and post analysis, remote metering and monitoring, Teleprotection, etc. 
The following figure shows the command prompt for selecting a particular message or 
command to be sent to the RTU via the network. 
 
Figure 7.14 An illustration of various messages which can be sent to the RTU for execution  
7.7. Conclusion 
Chapter 7 covered the simulation experiment setup and configuration. It discussed the tools 
and equipment required for the simulation experiment and gave the overall system overview. 
The setup and configuration of the IP/MPLS core network and the encryption thereof was 
discussed including the SCADA simulator (FieldComm) and the RTU configuration. The 
following chapter gives the results obtained having conducting the simulation experiment. 
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CHAPTER 8 
8. Experimental and Simulation Results 
8.1. Introduction 
Chapter 8 follows from the discussions of Chapter 7 and discusses the results of the 
experiment and simulation conducted for this research project. The results in this chapter are 
based on the experimental design, setup configuration, etc. discussed in Chapter 7. These 
results in this chapter are only focused on the key research question, which is “whether using 
encryption in SCADA systems, the services performance requirements are still met in OT IT 
environment over an MPLS core network”? The key focus area of the research question for 
this MSc 50/50 mini-thesis is encryption versus SCADA services performance requirements, 
and no other areas in the whole cyber security value chain. Thus the key outcome measure for 
this research project results would be based on Table 2.1 in chapter 2, which is latency and 
availability for each of the services over an encrypted MPLS/IP network versus the basic 
service requirements. Various sections in this chapter will present results conducted in a 
systematic manner in order to build on some of the results as stages. These stages are 
discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.4 through to Section 1.8.  
Section 8.2 shows the MPLS network’s successful function on its own. Section 8.3 gives 
results of the encryption/decryption designed and applied at the network periphery. Section 
8.4 gives results of connecting the SCADA to the RTU directly without any encryption, 
without the IP network (8.4.1). Then Section 8.4.3 gives various successful connections 
through the encrypted MPLS core network with encryption and decryption functional as 
tested in Section 8.3. Section 8.4.3 is the final integration stage just prior the various services 
commands are sent over this encrypted MPLS/IP core network.  The various sub-sections of 
Section 8.5 give the results of the various SCADA services over this encrypted MPLS/IP 
network. Section 8.6 gives the results of the RTU Error Statistics. From Chapter 7, Section 
7.3.4 it was discussed that RTU Error Statistics will be used as measure to determine the level 
of availability of the encrypted MPLS/IP core network and the ability of the SCADA services 
message to propagate through this network without many issues and the losses associated. 
This chapter then concludes with Section 8.7 whereby the results of the experiment and 
simulation are analysed and summarized.  
8.2. IP/MPLS Core network Routers Configuration Results  
The following figure gives an illustration of the successful configuration of the Router 1 and 
Router 2 without the encryption. It shows that all interfaces have been configured correctly 
and that they are working fine as per the status “OK?” given as yes for each interface. The 
figures also show the IP addresses for each interface where it was assigned. Where the IP 
address is not assigned it is because the type of interface chosen for this particular interface 
during the routers configuration is a switch and thus no requirement for assigning an IP 
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address. This was done for interfaces connected to other routers that are not essential for this 
experiment, which is router 3 and 4. Router 1 and 2 are the critical ones and where the 
encryption and decryption was applied to preserve processing power as the computer that was 
used for the experiment is not powerful. However the configuration design can be extended 
to an innumerable number of routers if the processing power is available. Thus for this 
simulation experiment, router 1 and router 2 suffices. 
 
Figure 8.1 An illustration of Router 1 interfaces configuration 
 
Figure 8.2 An illustration of Router 2 interfaces configuration  
Router 1 pings 
The following figures give an illustration of successful communication between the various 
interfaces through successful pings to the various interfaces. 
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Figure 8.3 Router 1 to 192.168.1.2 (interface facing the LAN network) interface successful ping 
 
Figure 8.4 Router 1 to 192.168.2.1 interface successful ping 
 
Figure 8.5 Router 1 to 192.168.1.5 interface successful ping 
 
Figure 8.6 Router 1 to 192.168.2.2 interface successful ping 
 
Figure 8.7 Router 1 to 192.168.1.6 (Loopback network) interface successful ping 
Router 2 pings 
The following figures give an illustration of successful communication between the various 
interfaces through successful pings to the various interfaces by Router 2. 
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Figure 8.8 Router 2 to 192.168.1.5 interface successful ping 
 
Figure 8.9 Router 2 to 192.168.2.2 interface successful ping 
 
Figure 8.10 Router 2 to 192.168.1.6 interface successful pings 
 
Figure 8.11 Router 2 to 192.168.2.1 interface successful pings 
 
Figure 8.12 Router 2 to 192.168.1.2 (interface facing LAN) interface successful ping 
8.3. IP/MPLS Core network Encryption configuration Results 
The following is a simple screen dump which shows the crypto engine correctly applied to 
the respective routers within the simulation. 
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Figure 8.13 An illustration of the correct application of crypto engine to Router 1 
 
Figure 8.14 An illustration of the correct application of crypto engine to Router 2 
8.4. SCADA and RTU Connection Results  
The following set of results confirm, firstly the successful connection of SCADA to the RTU 
as a direct connection to the RTU without going through the IP/MPLS core network, 
basically a direct link from SCADA to the RTU. Then the results are followed by a SCADA 
connection to the RTU through the encrypted MPLS/IP core network through the 
confirmation of the conversion from RS232 to TCP, then the confirmation of the other 
emulator converting back from TCP/IP to RS232 and lastly the confirmation of the 
connection to the RTU with a response.  
8.4.1. SCADA (FieldComm) and RTU connection confirmation without 
going through the IP/MPLS Core network 
The following section gives results confirming the connection of the SCADA to the RTU. 
Firstly the results show the human machine interface of SCADA when the connection has not 
been established yet. From the following Figure 8.15 below, it can be seen that the RTU 1234 
in the bottom red bubble it is stated as offline in the window named Point Database. In the 
main window the SCADA (Src) with address 3 is sending data to RTU with address 1234 
with no response as shown by the red bubble in the window titled “Summary”. This is done 
to show the difference between when a SCADA is not connected to the RTU and also when 
the connection is successful as it is illustrated below. 
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Figure 8.15. The figure shows no connection between the SCADA and RTU. 
The following screen shot in Figure 8.16 illustrates a successful connection between SCADA 
and the RTU. In the window stated as summary, it can be noted that the SCADA with address 
3 is sending data to RTU with address 1234 and also there is a response from RTU with 
address 1234 to SCADA with address 3. It can further be noted that in the window named 
point database the RTU is no longer offline as in the previous figure above. This confirms the 
connection of the SCADA to the RTU. 
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Figure 8.16. The figure shows the confirmation of SCADA connection to the RTU. 
8.4.2. Emulator TCP/IP Serial Confirmation  
The results in the previous section are from when the SCADA is directly connected to the 
RTU via a RS232 link and not through the IP/MPLS network. In order for the communication 
to be possible between the current SCADA and RTU, which both use RS232 for 
communication through the TCP/IP network, the RS232 information needs to be 
encapsulated into TCP/IP data packets as discussed in the previous chapter. For this 
experiment a TCP/IP-RS232 emulator was used.  
The first converter or emulator used was to convert the RS232 or serial information generated 
by the SCADA into TCP/IP data packets so that it can be transmitted over an IP/MPLS core 
network. In this particular case the SCADA sends the serial information to COM port 2 and 
the emulator takes the information from COM port 2 and encapsulates it into a TCP/IP packet 
with the destination IP address 192.168.1.6 that is the intended IP address of the connection 
point connected to the periphery just before the intended RTU, in this case the loopback IP 
address. The following figure illustrates the configuration, the encapsulation of COM2 data to 
IP address 192.168.1.6.  
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Figure 8.17. Emulator used for Serial to TCP/IP conversion of SCADA information sent over the 
IP/MPLS core network. 
The following figure illustrates the results from the above Serial to TCP/IP convertor giving 
confirmation of the connection to the desired device on the periphery adjacent to the RTU 
with IP address 192.168.1.3 
 
Figure 8.18 Confirmation of emulator connection to destination 192.168.1.6 (Loopback) 
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The connection of the above emulator had to also be confirmed on the other emulator as it is 
illustrated in the next figure confirming the connection between 192.168.0.2 (SCADA) and 
192.168.1.6 (Loopback) before the conversion from TCP/IP-RS232 to the RTU. After the 
newly encapsulated information exits the IP/MPLS core network another TCP/IP to serial 
convertor is used to convert the TCP/IP data send by SCADA back to RS232 for processing 
by the RTU. The following figure confirms the connection from the device running the 
SCADA with IP address device 192.168.0.2. It confirms it as the source. The data will be 
converted back from TCP/IP to Serial communication and sending to Serial port COM 1 to 
the RTU. 
 
Figure 8.19 Emulator used for TCP/IP to Serial conversion of SCADA information to be executed by the 
RTU after propagation through encrypted IP/MPLS core network and also confirmation of connectivity 
between the two emulators through the network 
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8.4.3. SCADA (FieldComm) and RTU connection confirmation through the 
Encrypted IP/MPLS Core network 
After the connection between the Serial to TCP/IP converter and the TCP/IP to Serial 
convector though the encrypted IP/MPLS core network is confirmed, the connection between 
SCADA and RTU had to be confirmed. This was to confirm the following in this order: 
- the conversion from Serial to TCP was successful 
- the encryption of the encapsulated data 
- the propagation through the encrypted IP/MPLS core network was successful 
- the decryption of the encapsulated data 
- the conversion of TCP/IP back to Serial was successful 
- Lastly the communication between SCADA and the RTU was successful through 
messages and responses exchanged between SCADA and the RTU. 
The following figure gives the confirmation of the connection between SCADA and RTU 
after the conversion to TCP and propagation through the IP/MPLS core network with 
encryption and conversion back to Serial communication. The figure shows the RTU no 
longer offline with the data sent by SCADA and replies from the RTU. 
 
Figure 8.20 The figure confirms the communication between SCADA and RTU through the IP/MPLS 
core network with data conversion from Serial to TCP and back from TCP to Serial 
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8.5. Results of SCADA Services Tested over an encrypted 
IP/MPLS core network 
The following section gives results of SCADA services tested over an IP/MPLS core network 
which was created and configured with encryption.  
8.5.1. Telecontrol 
For this simulation, Telecontrol in FieldComm was represented by two modes of messages 
namely; Direct Operate and Operate (slightly different from direct operate). Each of the 
above message modes for Telecontrol have different modes of functions, generally “null, trip 
and close” for relay operation of which each of these messages was sent for execution by the 
RTU and the results recorded hereto as printscreens of the SCADA dashboard of messages 
sent and responses. 
8.5.1.1. Direct Operate 
The direct operate mode was operated as a binary output with the function selected as “trip, 
close or null”. The following figure illustrates the SCADA services message dashboard for 
“Direct Operate”. 
 
Figure 8.21 An illustration of SCADA service message; "Direct Operate" dashboard 
- Null 
The first message sent under the “Direct Operate” service function is a “null” message to 
the RTU. The frame details as per the SCADA dashboard is illustrated in the following 
figure with the response from the RTU given the subsequent figure.  
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Figure 8.22 Frame details of null function by SCADA to the RTU for Direct Operate service function 
The following figures gives the reply from the RTU which means the message successfully 
reached the RTU and RTU provided a response. 
 
Figure 8.23 Frame details of a reply by the RTU for the null function sent by SCADA to the RTU for 
Direct Operate service function 
- Trip 
The other message sent under the “Direct Operate” service function is a “Trip” message to 
the RTU which is normally used to trip a breaker through a relay. The frame details as per 
the SCADA dashboard is illustrated in the following figure with the response from the RTU 
given the subsequent figure.  
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Figure 8.24 Frame details of trip function by SCADA to the RTU for Direct Operate service function 
The following figure gives a response frame detail from the RTU to the SCADA regarding 
the execution of the “Trip” SCADA function for the Direct Operate service function. 
 
Figure 8.25 Frame details of a reply by the RTU for the trip function sent by SCADA to the RTU for 
Direct Operate service function 
- Close 
The last message sent by SCADA under the “Direct Operate” service function is a “Close” 
message to the RTU which is normally used to close a breaker through a relay. The frame 
details as per the SCADA dashboard is illustrated in the following figure with the response 
from the RTU given the subsequent figure.  
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Figure 8.26 Frame details of trip function by SCADA to the RTU for Direct Operate service function 
The following figure gives a response frame detail from the RTU to the SCADA regarding 
the execution of the “Close” SCADA function for the Direct Operate service function. 
 
Figure 8.27 Frame details of a reply by the RTU for the close function sent by SCADA to the RTU for 
Direct Operate service function 
8.5.1.2. Operate 
The operate mode was operated as a binary output with the function selected as trip or close. 
The following figure illustrates the SCADA services message dashboard for “Operate”. 
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Figure 8.28 The Operate message dashboard illustration 
- Trip 
The message sent under the “Operate” service function is a “Trip” message to the RTU 
which is normally used to trip a breaker through a relay. The frame details as per the 
SCADA dashboard is illustrated in the following figure with the response from the RTU 
given the subsequent figure.  
 
Figure 8.29 Frame details of trip function by SCADA to the RTU for Operate service function 
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The following figure gives a response frame detail from the RTU to the SCADA regarding 
the execution of the “Trip” SCADA function for the “Operate” service function. 
 
Figure 8.30 Frame details of a reply by the RTU for the trip function sent by SCADA to the RTU for 
Operate service function 
- Close 
The last message sent by SCADA under the “Operate” service function is a “Close” 
message to the RTU which is normally used to close a breaker through a relay. The frame 
details as per the SCADA dashboard is illustrated in the following figure with the response 
from the RTU given the subsequent figure.  
 
Figure 8.31 Frame details of close function by SCADA to the RTU for Operate service function 
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The following figure gives a response frame detail from the RTU to the SCADA regarding 
the execution of the “Close” SCADA function for the Operate service function. 
 
Figure 8.32 Frame details of a reply by the RTU for the close function sent by SCADA to the RTU for 
Operate service function 
8.5.2. Substation Condition 
The substation condition was simulated using cold restart, warm restart and integrity poll 
message. 
8.5.2.1. Integrity poll 
As aforementioned one of the messages sent by SCADA to simulate the substation condition 
was an “Integrity poll” message to the RTU. The frame details as per the SCADA dashboard 
is illustrated in the following figure with the response from the RTU given the subsequent 
figure.  
 
Figure 8.33 An Illustration of an integrity poll message 
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Figure 8.34 Frame details of Integrity Poll function by SCADA to the RTU 
The following figure gives a response frame detail from the RTU to the SCADA regarding 
the execution of the “Integrity Poll” SCADA function. 
 
Figure 8.35 Frame details of a reply by the RTU for the Integrity Poll function sent by SCADA to the 
RTU 
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8.5.2.2. Cold Restart 
As aforementioned one of the messages sent by SCADA to simulate the substation condition 
was a “Cold restart” message to the RTU. The frame details as per the SCADA dashboard is 
illustrated in the following figure with the response from the RTU given the subsequent 
figure.  
 
Figure 8.36 Frame details of Cold Restart function by SCADA to the RTU 
The following figure gives a response frame detail from the RTU to the SCADA regarding 
the execution of the “Cold Restart” SCADA function. 
 
Figure 8.37 Frame details of a reply by the RTU for the Event Poll function sent by SCADA to the RTU 
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8.5.2.3. Warm Restart 
As aforementioned one of the messages sent by SCADA to simulate the substation condition 
was a “Warm Restart” message to the RTU. The frame details as per the SCADA dashboard 
is illustrated in the following figure with the response from the RTU given the subsequent 
figure.  
 
Figure 8.38 Frame details of Cold Restart function by SCADA to the RTU 
The following figure gives a response frame detail from the RTU to the SCADA regarding 
the execution of the “Warm Restart” SCADA function. The “Warm Restart” was 
implemented successfully as shown by the response frame detail response and also the with 
the time delay attributed as fine. 
 
Figure 8.39 Frame details of a reply by the RTU for the Warm Restart function sent by SCADA to the 
RTU 
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8.5.3. Remote Monitoring/Metering 
The monitoring and metering function was simulated by the “read date and time” function 
and also the “write date and time” function. 
8.5.3.1. Read date and time 
The first message sent by SCADA to simulate the remote monitoring and metering is the 
“Read date and time” message to the RTU. The frame details as per the SCADA dashboard 
is illustrated in the following figure with the response from the RTU given the subsequent 
figure.  
 
Figure 8.40 An Illustration of a read date and time message 
 
Figure 8.41 Frame details of Read Date and Time function by SCADA to the RTU 
The following figure gives a response frame detail from the RTU to the SCADA regarding 
the execution of the “Read Date and Time” SCADA function. It shows the time and date 
which were read from the RTU. The propagation time and the processing time in this instance 
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was slight longer due to reasons which could not be determined, however since this part of 
the simulation illustrates a non-critical, non-time sensitive service, the propagation delay and 
latency introduced is acceptable. This part of the simulation represents remote device 
monitoring which monitors the health status of the device which is not time critical. 
Furthermore this part of the simulation can represent the reading of metering information 
which is also not that much of a time critical event during the actual reading.  
 
Figure 8.42 Frame details of a reply by the RTU for the Read Date and Time function sent by SCADA to 
the RTU 
8.5.3.2. Write Date and Time 
The other message which was sent by SCADA to simulate the remote monitoring service is 
the “Write date and time” message to the RTU. This message represent an instance whereby 
data was initially read from RTU and other IED devices in the substation and simple changes 
needs to be made, hence the representation by “Write date and time”. The frame details as 
per the SCADA dashboard is illustrated in the following figure with the response from the 
RTU given the subsequent figure.  
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Figure 8.43 An Illustration of a Write date and time message 
 
 
 
Figure 8.44 An Illustration of a Write date and time message with a date change 
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Frame details of Write Date and Time function by SCADA to the RTU 
The following figure gives a response frame detail from the RTU to the SCADA regarding 
the execution of the “Write Date and Time” SCADA function. As it can be seen the time 
recorded on the response frame is similar to the one sent with a just a variation of 
milliseconds introduced due to propagation time and processing time.  
 
Figure 8.45 Frame details of a reply by the RTU for the Write Date and Time function sent by SCADA to 
the RTU 
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8.6. RTU Error Statistics 
This sections gives overall results of the SCADA (FieldComm)’s RTU Error Statistics. It 
gives a graph of Errors encountered when the SCADA simulator communicates with the 
RTU. The error types as discussed in Chapter 7 are as follows: 
- Bad CRC:  counted when a bad CRC is received from the RTU.  
- User Data Overflow: SCADA (FieldComm) allows the application layer fragments to 
be 2048 bytes and if this is exceeded  by a slave (RTU) then it is counted as an error. 
- Sequence Errors: this error is counted when a Transport layer sequence number 
arrives not in the correct sequence from the RTU 
- Confirm Retries: this error is when SCADA performs a Link Layer Retry after an 
initial Timeout 
- Confirm Failure: This error is incremented after the pre-determined number of retries 
is exceeded without success and SCADA fails the link transmission. 
- AL No Responses: This refers to errors whenever no response is received to a request 
within the configured Application Layer Response Timeout. 
The following figure gives the results of a RTU error Statistics for the first iteration of 
SCADA communication with a RTU over an encrypted IP/MPLS core network in this 
simulation experiment. Overall as it can be seen there are no errors according to the SCADA 
with the exception of the AL No Responses which experienced overall 2 errors. These errors 
could have resulted due to initialization of the simulation experiment. The overall error 
statistics is reasonably good. 
 
Figure 8.46 The RTU Errors Statistics for the first iteration of SCADA communication with a RTU over 
an encrypted IP/MPLS core network 
The following figure gives the results of a RTU error Statistics for the second iteration of 
SCADA communication with a RTU over an encrypted IP/MPLS core network simulation 
experiment. The second iteration is even much better than the first one, there were no errors 
encountered as illustrated in the RTU graph below. This implies that the communication 
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between the SCADA and the RTU over an encrypted IP/MPLS core link with encryption is 
successful with no errors due to packet loss or delays.  
 
Figure 8.47 The RTU Errors Statistics for the second iterations of SCADA communication with a RTU 
over an encrypted IP/MPLS core network 
8.7. Summary of Results 
This section discusses the summary of the results obtained in this chapter and analyzes them.  
Section 8.2 results demonstrate that the design and configuration of the MPLS/IP network 
was successful. The various interfaces worked perfectly and were able to send information 
across each interface of the routers. The propagation round-trip in some of the pings of 
various interfaces were recorded with a maximum of 4ms, an average of 4ms and a minimum 
also 4ms. Other propagation round-trips were recorded, some were extremely lower and 
others relatively higher. Some of the higher ones were due to mostly initialization issues. This 
implies that the average round-trip for the MPLS/IP core network is less than 4ms on 
average. The protocol indicated as up meaning and IP addresses assign and the status, “OK?” 
of the routers as YES. This meant that the MPLS/IP design and configuration as discussed in 
Chapter 7, Section 7.3 was done correctly and successfully. 
Section 8.3 results demonstrate that the crypto engine (encryption and decryption) was 
designed and applied correctly to the respective routers’ interfaces for the simulated MPLS/IP 
network. The screen dumps of Figure 8.13 and Figure 8.14 shows the crypto engine 
connections on the routers as active. These figures further describe the type which IPSec and 
the algorithm used, which is AES256 with SHA. The analysis is that the encryption was 
successful designed and implemented. The code thereof is given in Appendix B. 
Section 8.4 gives results of SCADA and RTU connections results. In Section 8.4.1 a direct 
connection between the SCADA and RTU was implemented and the results given. At this 
stage the connection between the SCADA and RTU is without going through the encrypted 
MPLS/IP core network, but simply a direct link. This was done as aforementioned for 
calibration purposes such that it is known what a successful direct connection looks like. 
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Figure 8.15 gives results of an “Unsuccessful” connection between an RTU and SCADA. The 
figure shows that there is no response in the SCADA (FieldComm) Summary window. The 
point database displays the RTU as offline. Both of these are given by red bubbles in Figure 
8.15. Figure 8.16 gives results of a successful connection between the SCADA and the RTU 
as a direct connection without going through the encrypted MPLS/IP core network. It this 
figure is demonstrated by SCADA (FieldComm) summary window stating and showing 
successful communication through initial communication to the RTU and a response. 
Furthermore the window named RTU database shows the RTU as online and no longer says 
offline as it did in Figure 18.15. Section 8.4.2 gives the results of the emulation that is the 
encapsulation of data from RS232 to TCP/IP. Figure 8.17 to Figure 8.19 shows that the 
emulation was successful. Section 8.4.3 can be considered as the final integration stage, 
where the RTU and SCADA communicate via the previously tested designed MPLS/IP core 
network with encryption implemented and the emulation of RS232 to TCP/IP information. 
This meant that information send by the SCADA (FieldComm) was encapsulated into 
TCP/IP, then encrypted by the crypto engine, then propagate through the TCP/IP network, 
decrypted, converted back to RS232 for the RTU. Figure 8.20 shows that this communication 
between SCADA and RTU through the encrypted MPLS/IP network is successful. This is 
similar to the results obtained by a direct link between the SCADA and RTU, given by Figure 
8.16 which was discussed briefly above. There is communication between SCADA and a 
response from the RTU. The RTU is not shown as offline but it is online. 
After the above successful results, the next results were results obtained from sending various 
SCADA services, as given in Table 2.1, over this encrypted MPLS/IP core network. Section 
8.5.1 gives the results of messages that were sent representing the Telecontrol service. The 
first message sent is “Direct Operate” which has three commands, null, trip and close. 
Figure 8.22 shows the successfully sent “Null” command by SCADA and Figure 8.23 shows 
the response from the RTU. The response message shows the time the response was received. 
The time in these messages are only measure up until only seconds, nothing beyond that. 
Similarly the “Trip” and “Close” commands’ results (RTU responses) are given in Figure 
8.25 and Figure 8.27 respectively. All the commands for Telecontrol, Direct Operate 
messages were successful. The next set of messages for Telecontrol was Operate. With the 
Operate, trip and close commands were sent through the encrypted MPLS/IP network 
through to the RTU. Similarly to the Direct Operate the Telecontrol, Operate message 
commands were successful because responses were received from the RTU. These 
commands messages that were sent and with their responses received from the RTU are given 
in Figures 8.28 to Figure 8.32 without any issues. Substation condition was simulated using 
cold restart, warm restart and integrity poll messages as discussed Section 8.5.2. The 
experiment showed successful communication for the various messages between SCADA 
and RTU over the encrypted MPLS/IP core network without and issues. These successful 
communications are demonstrated in Figures 8.33 to Figure 8.39. Remote 
Monitoring/Metering as previously discussed was simulated by the “read date and time” 
function and also the “write date and time” function. The messages were successfully sent 
from SCADA to RTU through the encrypted MPLS/IP core network with successful 
responses from the RTU. These results are given successfully by Figure 8.40 to Figure 8.45.  
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In addition to having successfully sent various SCADA services messages to the RTU over 
an encrypted IP/MPLS network, the important thing was to determine whether they reached 
the RTU in the appropriate time as prescribed by the minimum SCADA service requirements 
as described in Table 2.1. This meant determining the overall maximum latency (delay) that 
could be experienced by packets propagating from the SCADA to the RTU. In terms of the 
latency (delay) calculation, for this research project, the total latency value can be determined 
and estimated by the following equation below. 
 !"#$%&'(')* =  !"#$%&+, - +  !"#$%&/$%0&1"23$ +  !"#$%&4#%0&1"23$     (8.1) 
During the simulation experiment it was difficult to measure latency for each encrypted and 
decrypted packet. The latency for propagating through the virtual IP/MPLS core network was 
relatively easier to determine although it was subjective to the processing capability of the 
computer used, however for the purpose of this experiment that determined latency suffices. 
The latency for the MPLS core network can be determined by one end of the network 
interface ping the other end of the network interface. This is shown as the “round-trip” time 
in the various figures in Chapter 8, Section 8.2. As discussed above the average propagation 
round-trip was on average 4ms meaning a single trip of 2ms, however there were other 
propagation round-trip recorded. The maximum measured for this network was a round-trip 
of 26ms which means a single trip of 13ms. Thus in order to fully analyze the results the 
maximum possible measured propagation round-trip was used. In terms of the encryption and 
decryption latency, it can be assumed that the latency for each of them is the same as it takes 
roughly the same amount of time to encrypt and decrypt the same amount of data. This means 
that equation (8.1) is simplified to be; 
567879: = 56;<=> + 2 × 56?@ABCDEF   (8.2) 
For this experiment the encryption processing time was measured as the latency between the 
interface at which a packet to be encrypted enters router 1 and also the interface in which it 
leaves after encryption. The challenging part was tracing packets to measure their latencies, 
however this was achieved by sampling a packet and measure its “Time since previous frame 
in this TCP stream” which is a function under Time Stamps. Thus a small number of packets 
were selected and their values noted down. Most of the packets picked had 0.00000 seconds. 
One or two of the selected packets, had the value of 0.000065000 seconds.  This is illustrated 
in the following figure. 
 
Figure 8.48 A demonstration of an encryption introduced latency 
This meant that the latency introduced by encryption and decryption was negligible compared 
to the propagation latency introduced by the IP/MPLS core network. This is due to the type 
of encryption chosen for this research project. Using equation (8.2) 
100 
 
567879: = 56;<=> + 2 × 56?@ABCDEF    (8.3) 
567879: = 13 + 65I 
567879: ≈ 13 
567879: < 14 ≪ 200 
This means that the latency introduced is around 13ms, which could be even less as it was 
also caused to some extent by the processing capabilities of the computer used for this 
simulation. This latency is still way less than the average 200ms latency requirements of the 
various SCADA services. Furthermore it must be recalled that in Figure 7.11, Section 7.6.2 
during the RTU and SCADA (FieldComm) configuration, the “Inter-message Delay” was set 
to a limit of 20ms. This meant that messages which took longer than 20ms would be 
discarded. Since all the messages send to the RTU returned the expected response 
successfully, it can be concluded that the latency for all these messages were acceptable and 
lower than 20ms. Furthermore during the RTU configuration, the delay was limited to less 
than 200ms, as illustrated in Figure 7.13, Section 7.6.3. This meant that if the propagation for 
a single command is longer than 200ms the request will time out and a time out response will 
be issued to the SCADA simulator. This was to further check and verify that the acceptable 
and successful communication between SCADA and RTU were indeed successful. This was 
so done because the lowest latency requirement of SCADA services is less 200ms as given in 
Table 2.1. This further ascertain the latency calculation above, that the latency was lower 
than 14ms which is acceptable for all the SCADA services in an OT/IT environment as given 
in Table. 2.1.  
In terms of the losses, Section 8.6 recorded the loss statistics as recorded by the RTU. These 
are loss statistics which gives an indication of the different types and number of losses in 
terms of the messages by the RTU. In Figure 8.46 it can be seen that there two losses which 
could have been due to initialization and in Figure 8.47 there no losses recorded meaning that 
all messages were received successfully by the RTU which answers the question on loss and 
availability in terms of the requirements. This means that the losses were significantly less 
than 1% with availability more than satisfactory. 
The summary of the experimental and simulation results as compared to the requirements in 
Table 2.1 are given in Table 8.1 below. The conclusion of the results is that they were more 
than satisfactory for each of the SCADA services requirements. 
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   SCADA Service Performance 
Requirements 
Simulation Experiment Results 
SCADA Service Channel Priority Security Latency, Loss Availability Latency, Loss Availability Comments 
Substation 
Condition 
Monitoring and 
post analysis 
IP High Required Latency <200ms, 
Loss < 1% 
98% Latency <15ms, 
Loss << 1% 
100% 
Service Requirements Met 
Telecontrol 
(11kv, 22kv, 
33kv, substations 
RTU’s) 
IP, 
Ethernet 
Critical Required Latency <300ms, 
Loss < 0.05% 
98,33% Latency <15ms, 
Loss << 0.05% 
100% 
Service Requirements Met 
Telecontrol 
(11kv, 66kv, 
88kv, 132kv, 
substations 
RTU’s) 
IP, 
Ethernet 
Critical Required Latency <300ms, 
Loss < 0.05% 
98,33% Latency <15ms, 
Loss << 0.05% 
100% 
Service Requirements Met 
Remote Metering IP, High Required Latency <300ms, 
Loss < 1% 
98,33% Latency <15ms, 
Loss < <1% 
100% 
Service Requirements Met 
Control Centre 
Voice services 
IP Critical Optional Latency <150ms, 
Loss <1% 
98% N/A N/A This part of the simulation 
was not conducted as 
security is optional and due 
to lack of equipment. It 
forms part of future work 
Table 8.1 Summary of results of SCADA services over an encrypted IP/MPLS Core Network 
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CHAPTER 9 
9. Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Work 
This chapter discusses the conclusion of the research report and also the recommendations.  
9.1. Research Project Conclusion 
The goal of this research project was to determine whether using encryption in SCADA 
systems over IP/MPLS core network in an OT IT environment, the service performance 
requirements are still met as given chapter 1. This means the key focus area of the research 
project was encryption against SCADA service requirements over a packet switched 
networks only. This meant that the research project only focused on encryption only in the 
whole SCADA cyber security value chain. Other aspects of this value chain could be 
considered further and future work. With regards to encryption, as stated in Chapter 1, the 
research project needed to demonstrate confidentiality, availability and integrity which are 
key characteristics of encryption. When these are met, which are fundamental to encryption 
the service performance requirements of SCADA needed to be met over an MPLS/IP 
network.  
Confidentiality meant ensuring that the information source is really from the desired source 
in this case SCADA. This was demonstrated through the encryption configuration of the 
routers applied with identical and pre-authorization requirement to the two critical routers. 
This meant that no any other connecting router without the identical crypto engine applied to 
it would have been able to successfully interface with the configured routers. Furthermore, 
the IP address range allowable for communication was preconfigured and added as part of the 
crypto engine.   
Integrity refers to the information not altered and this was ascertained by the implementation 
of the AES-256 encryption with a SHA implementation. As discussed in chapter 5 a SHA 
value of any stream of data gives the same SHA value, however a slight alteration in the data 
stream changes the whole SHA value thus if the resulting two SHA values are not the same it 
would demonstrate that the information has been altered. Thus in this research project the 
integrity of the information was preserved through the implementation of SHA.  
Availability meant that the SCADA system is available all the time and the IP/MPLS network 
is reliable. This was achieved by how the MPLS configuration was done, it was done by 
implementing a tunneling strategy with encryption and other security features implemented. 
These ensured a reliable connection between the two critical routers. This achieves the 
average SCADA service requirement of around 99% in terms of availability and 1% in terms 
of losses. 
In terms of the latency, for this research project as given in Section 8.7 it was determined to 
be approximately 13ms. This was further ascertained by introducing the “Inter-Message 
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Delay” of 20ms during SCADA and RTU configuration such that services messages which 
exceeded 20ms in propagation after another message would not be received by the RTU. 
Another assertion was made through the configuration of the RTU such that the maximum 
allowable message delay be limited to 200ms. This meant that messages that took longer than 
200ms would be time out and a time response would be given as a response to the SCADA 
simulator. Since all expected responses from the RTU were received for each message, this 
meant that all messages met this criteria, thus it can be concluded that the latency requirement 
was met. The loss and availability requirement was ascertained by the report given by the 
RTU error statistic. 
The conclusion to the key research question, “Whether using encryption in SCADA systems, 
the services performance requirements are still met in OT IT environment over an encrypted 
MPLS core network?”, is that the requirements are met as demonstrated in this research 
project.  
9.2. Recommendations for Future work 
The following section discusses the recommendation for future work which can be 
undertaken to further expand on this research project. 
9.2.1. Proposed experiment for VHF (Voice) Services over IP/MPLS with 
encryption 
The simulation experimental work can be further extended to other services such as voice for 
substations operations. Herewith in this section is a brief summary of the future work that can 
be implemented. These proposed tests can in future be used to verify if the replacement of 
BME (Bandwidth Management Equipment)’s with Cisco routers (IP/MPLS core network) 
will meet the latency and quality of service requirements for SCADA voice service 
requirements as it did in other services. The future work could cover the implementation of 
the UHF and VHF services over an IP based network. These tests would be vital towards the 
migration away from the obsolete BME equipment in utilities by proving the services 
compatible with an underlying IP network platform as opposed to the incumbent BME 
platform as aforementioned. This lab experiment would involve the test of VHF voice 
transmission over an IP network and also the encryption and decryption thereof from a VHF 
Repeater at the far site to the Customer’s Control Centre equipment, as voice is part of the 
SCADA services even though security is characterized as optional. The encryption and 
decryption scheme would be implemented within the routers during configuration as it was 
done in the simulation in this research project. The lab experiment setup is as show in the 
following figure below. 
9.2.2. Proposed experiment for Teleprotection over IP/MPLS with 
encryption 
The experimental work can further be extended to other services such as Teleprotection over 
an encrypted MPLS/IP network. This type of experimentation would require real time 
network testing as the service requirements for this services are extremely strict and violation 
of this service could result in serious consequences. 
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Figure 9.1 Testing of voice services over IP network 
9.2.3. The Role for Digital Forensics in SCADA systems 
To further extend this research topic as future work and not only focusing on encryption but 
on the whole cyber security value chain in SCADA systems for value chain, the subject of 
digital forensics in SCADA system can be researched. This is of utmost importance as 
SCADA digital forensics deals with scenarios when something has happened in a SCADA 
system. Computer and Digital forensics is the process of identifying, preserving, analyzing 
and presenting digital and computer evidence in way that is legally acceptable (Van Der Haar 
& Leung, 2014). Similar principles of computer and digital forensics can be utilized in 
SCADA forensics. There is a great need for computer and digital forensics in SCADA 
systems not only for the abovementioned reason for finding out what has happened, but also 
as a legal requirement. It is required that organizations show that measures are put in place to 
try and defend its infrastructures against intrusion. If this cannot be demonstrated, the 
organization’s senior management can be held personally liable for damages. This intrusion 
can be proved by using digital forensics tools and principles making it easier and transparent 
to find out what has happened. The main objective of digital forensics in SCADA systems is 
to determine what happened in a case of an event through an investigative process. The 
investigation process follows a trail that an intruder leaves during the commissioning of the 
intrusion to SCADA systems. This process then ties the system intruder to the intrusion and 
the system that was compromised. This investigative process is based on the commonly 
known Locard’s Exchange principle used in normal criminal investigations. Locard’s 
Exchange principle states that a contact between two items always results in an exchange 
(Petherick, et al., 2010). For example in a crime scene, there is an exchange of evidence 
between the offender and the victim, between the victim and the weapon, between the 
offender and the weapon and between the victim, the offender and the scene itself. The same 
principle applies in digital forensics for SCADA whereby there can be an exchange between 
the intruder and the SCADA system. Thus the Locard’s Exchange principle has been 
extended to the digital realm as illustrated in the Figure 9.3 below. 
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Figure 9.2 An illustration of the Locard's Exchange Principle (Casey, 2004) 
It is important to note that the evidence obtained during SCADA digital forensics be done in 
a proper manner as failure to do so may deem the evidence unusable in court for litigation 
and other legal or corporate proceedings. This means the evidence obtained through this 
process must be authentic, meaning it must be in the same state that it was found. The 
evidence must remain in the state it was collected and this must be demonstrated through 
Chain of Custody (Ryder, 2002). Lastly the evidence must be obtained legally. There is a 
shortage of tools and skills with regards to SCADA digital forensics and hence why it is 
recommended and as future work towards the cyber security value chain. 
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Appendix A: A Typical Utility IP/MPLS Core Network 
 
Figure 0.1: An illustration of a typical utility IP/MPLS core network (Anon., 2014)
IV 
 
Appendix B: Code for Configuration 
Connected to Dynamips VM "R1" (ID 0, type c3725) - Console port 
Press ENTER to get the prompt. 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 00:37:06.475: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex),                
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
Router1#configure terminal 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
Router1(config)#hostname Router3 
Router3(config)#no aaa new-model 
Router3(config)#ip cef 
Router3(config)#no ip domain lookup 
Router3(config)#multilink bundle-name 
*Mar  1 00:38:06.471: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex),                
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router3(config)#multilink bundle-name authenticated 
Router3(config)#router rip version 2 
                           ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
 
Router3(config)#router rip 
Router3(config-router)#version2 
                              ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
Router3(config-router)#version 2 
Router3(config-router)#network 192.168 
*Mar  1 00:39:06.467: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex),                
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router3(config-router)#network 192.168.2.0 
Router3(config-router)#network 192.168.0.0 
Router3(config-router)#interface fastethernet0/0 
Router3(config-if)#description To_Router2 
 V 
Router3(config-if)#ip 
*Mar  1 00:40:06.459: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex),                
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router3(config-if)#ip address 192.169.2.1 255.255.255.0 
Router3(config-if)#duplex auto 
Router3(config-if)#speed auto 
Router3(config-if)# 
*Mar  1 00:41:06.455: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex),                
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router3(config-if)#interface fastethernet0/1 
Router3(config-if)#ip address 192.168.0.4 255.255.255.0 
Router3(config-if)#duplex auto 
Router3(config-if)#speed auto 
Router3(config-if)#no shutdown 
Router3(config-if)# 
*Mar  1 00:42:06.451: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex),                
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router3(config-if)#exit 
Router3(config)#interface fastethernet0/0 
Router3(config-if)#no shutdown 
Router3(config-if)#exit 
Router3(config)#exit 
Router3# 
*Mar  1 00:42:32.279: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console 
Router3#sh ip int brie 
Interface                  IP-Address      OK? Method Status                Protocol 
FastEthernet0/0            192.169.2.1     YES manual up                    up 
FastEthernet0/1            192.168.0.4     YES manual up                    up 
NVI0                       192.169.2.1     YES unset  up                    up 
Router3# 
Building configuration... 
[OK] 
Router3# 
 VI
*Mar  1 00:42:53.495: %SYS-2-MALLOCFAIL: Memory allocation of 32768 bytes failed from 0x600286B4, alignment 0 
Pool: Processor  Free: 26732  Cause: Not enough free memory 
Alternate Pool: None  Free: 0  Cause: No Alternate pool 
 -Process= "Exec", ipl= 0, pid= 244,  -Traceback= 0x61467A3C 0x600165C4 0x6001C400 0x6001CBAC 0x600286BC 
0x600               29620 0x614AF920 0x614AF994 0x614AFA2C 0x60594608 0x614B7090 0x6059E8C0 0x614AF694 
0x61476F68 0x61477830 0x614               D3978 
Router3#config 
*Mar  1 00:43:06.447: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex),                
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router3#configure terminal 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
Router3(config)#hostname Router1 
Router1(config)#exit 
Router1#wr 
Building configuration... 
*Mar  1 00:43:19.203: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console[OK] 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 00:43:24.123: %SYS-2-MALLOCFAIL: Memory allocation of 32768 bytes failed from 0x600286B4, alignment 0 
Pool: Processor  Free: 26620  Cause: Not enough free memory 
Alternate Pool: None  Free: 0  Cause: No Alternate pool 
 -Process= "Exec", ipl= 0, pid= 244,  -Traceback= 0x61467A3C 0x600165C4 0x6001C400 0x6001CBAC 0x600286BC 
0x600               29620 0x614AF920 0x614AF994 0x614AFA2C 0x60594608 0x614B7090 0x6059E8C0 0x614AF694 
0x61476F68 0x61477830 0x614               D3978 
Router1#wr 
Building configuration... 
[OK] 
Router1#wr 
Building configuration... 
[OK] 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 00:44:06.443: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex),                
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 00:45:06.451: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex),                
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
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Router1# 
*Mar  1 00:46:06.475: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex),                
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 00:47:06.495: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex),                
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 00:48:06.523: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex),                
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1#interface fastethernet0/1 
         ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
Router1#configure terminal 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
Router1(config)#interface fastethernet0/1 
Router1(config-if)#ip address 192 
*Mar  1 00:49:06.547: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1(config-if)#ip address 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0 
Router1(config-if)#exit 
Router1(config)#exit 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 00:49:58.667: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console 
Router1#sh ip int brie 
Interface                  IP-Address      OK? Method Status                Protocol 
FastEthernet0/0            192.169.2.1     YES manual up                    up 
FastEthernet0/1            192.168.1.2     YES manual up                    up 
NVI0                       192.169.2.1     YES unset  up                    up 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 00:50:06.563: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1#configure terminal 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
Router1(config)#interface fastethernet0/1 
 VIII
Router1(config-if)#ip address 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0 
Router1(config-if)#no shutdown 
Router1(config-if)#exit 
Router1(config)#network 192.168.1.0 
                       ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
Router1(config)#configure terminal 
                        ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
Router1(config)#exit 
Router1#confgir 
*Mar  1 00:51:55.787: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console 
Router1#configure terminal 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
Router1(config)#router rip 
Router1(config-router)#version 2 
Router1(config-router)#network 192.168.1.0 
Router1(config-router)#network 192.168.2.0 
Router1(config-router)#exit 
Router1(config)#end 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 00:52:50.963: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console 
Router1#sh ip int brie 
Interface                  IP-Address      OK? Method Status                Protocol 
FastEthernet0/0            192.169.2.1     YES manual up                    up 
FastEthernet0/1            192.168.1.2     YES manual up                    up 
NVI0                       192.169.2.1     YES unset  up                    up 
Router1#ping 192.168.2.2 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
..... 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 22/24/46 ms 
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Router1#configure terminala 
                          ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
Router1#configure terminal 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
Router1(config)#router rip 
Router1(config-router)#version 2 
Router1(config-router)#network 192.168.2.0 
Router1(config-router)#network 192.168.1.0 
Router1(config-router)#exit 
Router1(config)#interface fastethernet0/0 
Router1(config-if)#ip address 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.252 
Router1(config-if)#no shutdown 
Router1(config-if)#duplex auto 
Router1(config-if)#speed auto 
Router1(config-if)#exit 
Router1(config)#end 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:00:08.643: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console 
Router1#sh ip int brie 
Interface                  IP-Address      OK? Method Status                Protocol 
FastEthernet0/0            192.168.2.1     YES manual up                    up 
FastEthernet0/1            192.168.1.2     YES manual up                    up 
NVI0                       192.168.2.1     YES unset  up                    up 
Router1#ping 192.168.2.2 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 20/26/44 ms 
Router1#ping 192.168.1.2 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
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!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/3/8 ms 
Router1#ping 192.168.1.5 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.5, timeout is 2 seconds: 
..... 
Success rate is 0 percent (0/5) 
Router1#ping 192.168.2.1 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 4/4/4 ms 
Router1#ping 192.168.1.2 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 4/7/8 ms 
Router1#ping 192.168.2.2 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 12/36/72 ms 
Router1#ping 192.168.1.5 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.5, timeout is 2 seconds: 
..... 
Success rate is 0 percent (0/5) 
Router1#ping 192.168.0.3 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.0.3, timeout is 2 seconds: 
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..... 
Router1#configure terminal 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
Router1(config)#interface fastethernet0/1 
Router1(config-if)#ip address 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.252 
Router1(config-if)#no shutdown 
Router1(config-if)#duplex auto 
Router1(config-if)#speed auto 
Router1(config-if)#exit 
Router1(config)#router rip 
Router1(config-router)#version 2 
Router1(config-router)#network 192.168.1.0 
Router1(config-router)#network 192.168.2.0 
Router1(config-router)#exit 
Router1(config)#end 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:10:09.527: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console 
Router1#sh ip int brie 
Interface                  IP-Address      OK? Method Status                Protocol 
FastEthernet0/0            192.168.2.1     YES manual up                    up 
FastEthernet0/1            192.168.1.2     YES manual up                    up 
NVI0                       192.168.2.1     YES unset  up                    up 
Router1#ping 192.168.2.1 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/2/8 ms 
Router1#ping 192.168.1.2 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
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!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/2/4 ms 
Router1#ping 192.168.2.2 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 16/28/44 ms 
Router1#ping 192.168.1.5 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.5, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 20/25/36 ms 
Router1#wr 
Building configuration... 
[OK] 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:11:16.891: %SYS-2-MALLOCFAIL: Memory allocation of 32768 bytes failed from 0x600286B4, alignment 0 
Pool: Processor  Free: 25176  Cause: Not enough free memory 
Alternate Pool: None  Free: 0  Cause: No Alternate pool 
 -Process= "Exec", ipl= 0, pid= 244,  -Traceback= 0x61467A3C 0x600165C4 0x6001C400 0x6001CBAC 0x600286BC 
0x60029620 0x614AF920 0x614AF994 0x614AFA2C 0x60594608 0x614B7090 0x6059E8C0 0x614AF694 0x61476F68 
0x61477830 0x614D3978 
Router1#ping 192.168.2.1 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/3/8 ms 
Router1#ping 192.168.1.2 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
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Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/2/8 ms 
Router1#ping 192.168.2.2 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 20/32/56 ms 
Router1#ping 192.168.1.5 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.5, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 20/28/48 ms 
Router1#wr 
Building configuration... 
[OK] 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:15:12.887: %SYS-2-MALLOCFAIL: Memory allocation of 32768 bytes failed from 0x600286B4, alignment 0 
Pool: Processor  Free: 25152  Cause: Not enough free memory 
Alternate Pool: None  Free: 0  Cause: No Alternate pool 
 -Process= "Exec", ipl= 0, pid= 244,  -Traceback= 0x61467A3C 0x600165C4 0x6001C400 0x6001CBAC 0x600286BC 
0x60029620 0x614AF920 0x614AF994 0x614AFA2C 0x60594608 0x614B7090 0x6059E8C0 0x614AF694 0x61476F68 
0x61477830 0x614D3978 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:19:59.647: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
*Mar  1 01:20:00.643: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:20:01.647: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
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*Mar  1 01:21:01.647: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:22:34.651: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:22:35.655: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
*Mar  1 01:22:36.647: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:23:36.651: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:24:36.647: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:25:36.639: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:26:36.631: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:27:36.915: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:28:36.907: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:29:37.447: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:30:37.443: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:31:37.439: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1# 
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*Mar  1 01:32:37.431: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPF0F75584939D Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router1#sh ip int brief 
Interface                  IP-Address      OK? Method Status                Protocol 
FastEthernet0/0            192.168.2.1     YES manual up                    up 
FastEthernet0/1            192.168.1.2     YES manual up                    up 
NVI0                       192.168.2.1     YES unset  up                    up 
Router1#ping 192.168.1.1 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 8/16/24 ms 
Router1#wr 
Building configuration... 
[OK] 
Router1# 
*Mar  1 01:45:28.927: %SYS-2-MALLOCFAIL: Memory allocation of 32768 bytes failed from 0x600286B4, alignment 0 
Pool: Processor  Free: 25152  Cause: Not enough free memory 
Alternate Pool: None  Free: 0  Cause: No Alternate pool 
 -Process= "Exec", ipl= 0, pid= 244,  -Traceback= 0x61467A3C 0x600165C4 0x6001C400 0x6001CBAC 0x600286BC 
0x60029620 0x614AF920 0x614AF994 0x614AFA2C 0x60594608 0x614B7090 0x6059E8C0 0x614AF694 0x61476F68 
0x61477830 0x614D3978 
Router1#ping 192.168.1.6 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.6, timeout is 2 seconds: 
..... 
Success rate is 0 percent (0/5) 
Router1#configure terminal 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
Router1(config)#ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.1.6 
Router1(config)#exit 
Router1#end 
*Mar  1 01:47:54.499: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console 
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Router1#end 
Translating "end" 
Translating "end" 
% Unknown command or computer name, or unable to find computer address 
Router1#exit 
Router1 con0 is now available 
Press RETURN to get started. 
Router1#sh ip int brief 
Interface                  IP-Address      OK? Method Status                Protocol 
FastEthernet0/0            192.168.2.1     YES manual up                    up 
FastEthernet0/1            192.168.1.2     YES manual up                    up 
NVI0                       192.168.2.1     YES unset  up                    up 
Router1#ping 192.168.2.1 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/2/4 ms 
Router1#ping 192.1.2 
% Unrecognized host or address, or protocol not running. 
Router1#ping 192.168.2.1 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 4/7/8 ms 
Router1#ping 192.168.1.2 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/3/8 ms 
Router1#ping 192.168.2.2 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
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Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 40/49/60 ms 
Router1#ping 192.168.1.5 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.5, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 16/31/52 ms 
Router1#ping 192.168.1.6 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.6, timeout is 2 seconds: 
..... 
Success rate is 0 percent (0/5) 
Router1#ping 192.168.1.6 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.6, timeout is 2 seconds: 
..... 
Success rate is 0 percent (0/5) 
Router1# 
 
Connected to Dynamips VM "R2" (ID 1, type c3725) - Console port 
Press ENTER to get the prompt. 
 
R2# 
R2#configure terminal 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
R2(config)#hostname Router2 
Router2(config)#boot-start-marker 
Router2(config)#boot-end-marker 
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Router2(config)#no aaa new-model 
Router2(config)#ip cef 
Router2(config)#no ip domain lookup 
Router2(config)#multilink bundle-name authenticated 
Router2(config)#interface fastethernet0/0 
Router2(config-if)#ip address 192.168.2.2 255.255.255.0 
Router2(config-if)#no shutdown 
Router2(config-if)#duplex auto 
Router2(config-if)#speed auto 
Router2(config-if)#description Frm_Router1 
Router2(config-if)#interface fastethernet0/1 
Router2(config-if)#ip address 192.168.1.5 255.255.255.0 
Router2(config-if)#duplex auto 
Router2(config-if)#speed auto 
Router2(config-if)#no shutdown 
Router2(config-if)#exit 
Router2(config)#router rip 
Router2(config-router)#version 2 
Router2(config-router)#network 192.168.1.0 
Router2(config-router)#network 192.168.2.0 
Router2(config-router)#exit 
Router2(config)#end 
Router2# 
*Mar  1 00:48:20.503: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console 
Router2#sh ip int brie 
Interface                  IP-Address      OK? Method Status                Protocol 
FastEthernet0/0            192.168.2.2     YES manual up                    up 
FastEthernet0/1            192.168.1.5     YES manual up                    up 
NVI0                       192.168.2.2     YES unset  up                    up 
Router2#ping 192.168.2.2 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
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Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/3/8 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.2.1 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
..... 
Success rate is 0 percent (0/5) 
Router2#interface fastethernet 0/0 
         ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
 
Router2#configure terminal 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
Router2(config)#interface fastethernet0/0 
Router2(config-if)#ip address 192.168.2.2 255.255.255.252 
Router2(config-if)#duplex auto 
Router2(config-if)#speed auto 
Router2(config-if)#no shutdown 
Router2(config-if)#exit 
Router2(config)#interface fastethernet0/1 
Router2(config-if)#ip address 192.168.1.5 255.255.255.252 
Router2(config-if)#no shutdown 
Router2(config-if)#duplex auto 
Router2(config-if)#speed auto 
Router2(config-if)#exit 
Router2(config)#exit 
Router2#confi 
*Mar  1 00:56:28.887: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console 
Router2#configure terminal 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
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Router2(config)#router rip 
Router2(config-router)#version e 
 Wrong Rip version, only version 1 or version 2 is valid 
Router2(config-router)#network 192.168.1.0 
Router2(config-router)#network 192.168.2.0 
Router2(config-router)#exit 
Router2(config)#end 
Router2# 
*Mar  1 00:57:18.515: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console 
Router2#sh ip int brief 
Interface                  IP-Address      OK? Method Status                Protocol 
FastEthernet0/0            192.168.2.2     YES manual up                    up 
FastEthernet0/1            192.168.1.5     YES manual up                    up 
NVI0                       192.168.2.2     YES unset  up                    up 
Router2#wr 
Building configuration... 
[OK] 
Router2# 
*Mar  1 00:57:50.083: %SYS-2-MALLOCFAIL: Memory allocation of 32768 bytes failed from 0x600286B4, alignment 0 
Pool: Processor  Free: 20288  Cause: Not enough free memory 
Alternate Pool: None  Free: 0  Cause: No Alternate pool 
 -Process= "Exec", ipl= 0, pid= 92,  -Traceback= 0x61467A3C 0x600165C4 0x6001C400 0x6001CBAC 0x600286BC 
0x60029620 0x614AF920 0x614AF994 0x614AFA2C 0x60594608 0x614B7090 0x6059E8C0 0x614AF694 0x61476F68 
0x61477830 0x614D3978 
Router2#ping 192.168.2.1 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 16/24/44 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.1.5 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
 XXI
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.5, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/3/8 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.1.2 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 20/28/52 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.1.2 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 20/40/72 ms 
Router2#wr 
Building configuration... 
[OK] 
Router2# 
*Mar  1 01:03:30.983: %SYS-2-MALLOCFAIL: Memory allocation of 32768 bytes failed from 0x600286B4, alignment 0 
Pool: Processor  Free: 19636  Cause: Not enough free memory 
Alternate Pool: None  Free: 0  Cause: No Alternate pool 
 -Process= "Exec", ipl= 0, pid= 92,  -Traceback= 0x61467A3C 0x600165C4 0x6001C400 0x6001CBAC 0x600286BC 
0x60029620 0x614AF920 0x614AF994 0x614AFA2C 0x60594608 0x614B7090 0x6059E8C0 0x614AF694 0x61476F68 
0x61477830 0x614D3978 
Router2#ping 192.168.2.1 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 20/36/60 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.1.2 
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Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 16/26/40 ms 
Router2#sh ip int brief 
Interface                  IP-Address      OK? Method Status                Protocol 
FastEthernet0/0            192.168.2.2     YES manual up                    up 
FastEthernet0/1            192.168.1.5     YES manual up                    up 
NVI0                       192.168.2.2     YES unset  up                    up 
Router2#ping 192.168.2.2 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/4/8 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.1.5 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.5, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 4/7/8 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.2.1 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 20/26/36 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.2.1 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
 XXIII 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 20/28/36 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.1.2 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 16/26/40 ms 
Router2#ping 172.0.0.1 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 172.0.0.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
..... 
Success rate is 0 percent (0/5) 
Router2#ping 192.168.0.3 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.0.3, timeout is 2 seconds: 
..... 
Success rate is 0 percent (0/5) 
Router2#sh ip int brie 
Interface                  IP-Address      OK? Method Status                Protocol 
FastEthernet0/0            192.168.2.2     YES manual up                    up 
FastEthernet0/1            192.168.1.5     YES manual up                    up 
NVI0                       192.168.2.2     YES unset  up                    up 
Router2#ping 192.168.2.1 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 20/24/36 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.1.2 
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Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 20/28/52 ms 
Router2#wr 
Building configuration... 
[OK] 
Router2# 
*Mar  1 01:11:59.195: %SYS-2-MALLOCFAIL: Memory allocation of 32768 bytes failed from 0x600286B4, alignment 0 
Pool: Processor  Free: 19636  Cause: Not enough free memory 
Alternate Pool: None  Free: 0  Cause: No Alternate pool 
 -Process= "Exec", ipl= 0, pid= 92,  -Traceback= 0x61467A3C 0x600165C4 0x6001C400 0x6001CBAC 0x600286BC 
0x60029620 0x614AF920 0x614AF994 0x614AFA2C 0x60594608 0x614B7090 0x6059E8C0 0x614AF694 0x61476F68 
0x61477830 0x614D3978 
Router2#wr 
Building configuration... 
[OK] 
Router2# 
*Mar  1 01:15:17.339: %SYS-2-MALLOCFAIL: Memory allocation of 32768 bytes failed from 0x600286B4, alignment 0 
Pool: Processor  Free: 19636  Cause: Not enough free memory 
Alternate Pool: None  Free: 0  Cause: No Alternate pool 
 -Process= "Exec", ipl= 0, pid= 92,  -Traceback= 0x61467A3C 0x600165C4 0x6001C400 0x6001CBAC 0x600286BC 
0x60029620 0x614AF920 0x614AF994 0x614AFA2C 0x60594608 0x614B7090 0x6059E8C0 0x614AF694 0x61476F68 
0x61477830 0x614D3978 
Router2#sh ip int brief 
Interface                  IP-Address      OK? Method Status                Protocol 
FastEthernet0/0            192.168.2.2     YES manual up                    up 
FastEthernet0/1            192.168.1.5     YES manual up                    up 
NVI0                       192.168.2.2     YES unset  up                    up 
Router2#ping 192.168.2.2 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
 XXV
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 4/6/8 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.1.5 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.5, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 4/6/8 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.1.6 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.6, timeout is 2 seconds: 
.!!!! 
Success rate is 80 percent (4/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 8/9/12 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.1.6 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.6, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 4/16/32 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.2.1 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.2.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 28/31/36 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.1.2 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.2, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 16/24/44 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.1.3 
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Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.3, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 20/42/84 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.1.3 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.3, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 20/36/84 ms 
Router2#ping 192.168.1.1 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
..... 
Success rate is 0 percent (0/5) 
Router2#ping 192.168.1.1 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
..... 
Success rate is 0 percent (0/5) 
Router2#ping 192.168.1.1 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.1.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
..... 
Success rate is 0 percent (0/5) 
Router2#wr 
Building configuration... 
[OK] 
 XXVII 
Router2# 
*Mar  1 01:45:15.583: %SYS-2-MALLOCFAIL: Memory allocation of 32768 bytes failed from 0x600286B4, alignment 0 
Pool: Processor  Free: 19636  Cause: Not enough free memory 
Alternate Pool: None  Free: 0  Cause: No Alternate pool 
 -Process= "Exec", ipl= 0, pid= 92,  -Traceback= 0x61467A3C 0x600165C4 0x6001C400 0x6001CBAC 0x600286BC 
0x60029620 0x614AF920 0x614AF994 0x614AFA2C 0x60594608 0x614B7090 0x6059E8C0 0x614AF694 0x61476F68 
0x61477830 0x614D3978 
Router2#wr 
Building configuration... 
[OK] 
Router2#wr 
Building configuration... 
[OK] 
Router2# 
*Mar  1 01:52:39.643: %SYS-2-MALLOCFAIL: Memory allocation of 32768 bytes failed from 0x600286B4, alignment 0 
Pool: Processor  Free: 19636  Cause: Not enough free memory 
Alternate Pool: None  Free: 0  Cause: No Alternate pool 
 -Process= "Exec", ipl= 0, pid= 92,  -Traceback= 0x61467A3C 0x600165C4 0x6001C400 0x6001CBAC 0x600286BC 
0x60029620 0x614AF920 0x614AF994 0x614AFA2C 0x60594608 0x614B7090 0x6059E8C0 0x614AF694 0x61476F68 
0x61477830 0x614D3978 
Router2#wr 
Building configuration... 
[OK] 
Router2# 
//Code for Routers encryption configuration. 
Connected to Dynamips VM "R1" (ID 11, type c3725) - Console port 
Press ENTER to get the prompt. 
####################################################################################################
################################################################################## [OK] 
 
Smart Init is disabled. IOMEM set to: 5 
 
                                         Using iomem percentage: 5 
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              Restricted Rights Legend 
 
Use, duplication, or disclosure by the Government is 
subject to restrictions as set forth in subparagraph 
(c) of the Commercial Computer Software - Restricted 
Rights clause at FAR sec. 52.227-19 and subparagraph 
(c) (1) (ii) of the Rights in Technical Data and Computer 
Software clause at DFARS sec. 252.227-7013. 
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           170 West Tasman Drive 
           San Jose, California 95134-1706 
 
 
 
Cisco IOS Software, 3700 Software (C3725-ADVENTERPRISEK9-M), Version 12.4(15)T5, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc4) 
Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport 
Copyright (c) 1986-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. 
Compiled Wed 30-Apr-08 18:27 by prod_rel_team 
Image text-base: 0x60008930, data-base: 0x63647200 
 
 
 BIST FAILED... 
Unknown file system detected. 
Use format command to format the card as DOS File System. 
Or use erase command to format the card as Low End File System. 
 
This product contains cryptographic features and is subject to United 
States and local country laws governing import, export, transfer and 
use. Delivery of Cisco cryptographic products does not imply 
third-party authority to import, export, distribute or use encryption. 
Importers, exporters, distributors and users are responsible for 
 XXIX
compliance with U.S. and local country laws. By using this product you 
agree to comply with applicable laws and regulations. If you are unable 
to comply with U.S. and local laws, return this product immediately. 
 
A summary of U.S. laws governing Cisco cryptographic products may be found at: 
http://www.cisco.com/wwl/export/crypto/tool/stqrg.html 
 
If you require further assistance please contact us by sending email to 
export@cisco.com. 
 
Cisco 3725 (R7000) processor (revision 0.1) with 124928K/6144K bytes of memory. 
Processor board ID FTX0945W0MY 
R7000 CPU at 240MHz, Implementation 39, Rev 2.1, 256KB L2, 512KB L3 Cache 
2 FastEthernet interfaces 
DRAM configuration is 64 bits wide with parity enabled. 
55K bytes of NVRAM. 
16384K bytes of ATA System CompactFlash (Read/Write) 
Installed image archive 
 
SETUP: new interface FastEthernet0/0 placed in "shutdown" state 
SETUP: new interface FastEthernet0/1 placed in "shutdown" state 
 
 
Press RETURN to get started! 
 
 
*Mar  1 00:00:15.159: %LINEPROTO-5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface VoIP-Null0, changed state to up 
*Mar  1 00:00:15.163: %LINEPROTO-5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface IPv6-mpls, changed state to up 
*Mar  1 00:00:15.667: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from memory by console 
*Mar  1 00:00:15.759: %LINK-5-CHANGED: Interface FastEthernet0/1, changed state to administratively down 
*Mar  1 00:00:15.759: %LINK-5-CHANGED: Interface FastEthernet0/0, changed state to administratively down 
*Mar  1 00:00:16.779: %LINEPROTO-5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface FastEthernet0/1, changed state to down 
 XXX
*Mar  1 00:00:16.779: %LINEPROTO-5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface FastEthernet0/0, changed state to down 
*Mar  1 00:00:17.123: %SYS-5-RESTART: System restarted -- 
Cisco IOS Software, 3700 Software (C3725-ADVENTERPRISEK9-M), Version 12.4(15)T5, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc4) 
Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport 
Copyright (c) 1986-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. 
Compiled Wed 30-Apr-0 
R1# 
R1# 
8 18:27 by prod_rel_team 
                        *Mar  1 00:00:17.147: %SNMP-5-COLDSTART: SNMP agent on host R1 is undergoing a cold start 
*Mar  1 00:00:17.359: %CRYPTO-6-ISAKMP_ON_OFF: ISAKMP is OFF 
*Mar  1 00:00:17.363: %CRYPTO-6-GDOI_ON_OFF: GDOI is OFF 
 
R1# 
R1# 
R1# 
R1# 
R1# 
R1#conf t 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
R1(config)#crypto isakmp enable 
R1(config)#crypto isakmp policy 10 
R1(config-isakmp)#authentication pre-share 
R1(config-isakmp)#hash sha 
R1(config-isakmp)#encryption aes 256 
R1(config-isakmp)#group 5 
R1(config-isakmp)#lifetime 86400 
R1(config-isakmp)#exit 
R1(config)#crypto isakmp key SCADASECURE address 192.168.2.1 
R1(config)#crypto isakmp keepalive 10 2 periodic 
R1(config)#exit 
R1# 
 XXXI
*Mar  1 00:02:54.243: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console 
R1#conf t 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
R1(config)#crypto ipsec transform-set MYSETNAME esp-aes 256 esp-sha-hmac 
R1(cfg-crypto-trans)#mode tunnel 
R1(cfg-crypto-trans)#crypto ipsec transform-MYSETNAME 
                     ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
 
R1(cfg-crypto-trans)#ah-md5-hmac AH-HMAC-MD5 transform 
                     ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
 
R1(cfg-crypto-trans)#exit 
R1(config)#conf t 
                ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
 
R1(config)#$ 101 permit ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.2.0 0.0.0.255 
R1(config)#crypto map Router1_to_Router2 10 ipsec-isakmp 
% NOTE: This new crypto map will remain disabled until a peer 
        and a valid access list have been configured. 
R1(config-crypto-map)#set peer 192.168.2.2 
R1(config-crypto-map)#match address 101 
R1(config-crypto-map)#set transform-set MYSETNAME 
R1(config-crypto-map)#interface fastethernet 
% Incomplete command. 
 
R1(config)#interface fastethernet0/0 
R1(config-if)#crypto map Router1_to_Router2 
R1(config-if)#ip 
*Mar  1 00:09:32.883: %CRYPTO-6-ISAKMP_ON_OFF: ISAKMP is ON 
 XXXII 
R1(config-if)#ip route 192.168.1.6 255.255.255.252 192.168.2.1 
%Inconsistent address and mask 
R1(config)#ip route 192.168.1.6 255.255.255.255 192.168.2.1 
R1(config)#exit 
R1# 
*Mar  1 00:10:58.519: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console 
R1#conf t 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
R1(config)#interface fastethernet 0/0 
R1(config-if)#ip address 
% Incomplete command. 
 
R1(config-if)#ip address 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.252 
R1(config-if)#boot-start-marker 
R1(config)#boot-end-marker 
R1(config)#no aaa new-model 
R1(config)#ip cef 
R1(config)#no shutdown 
% Incomplete command. 
 
R1(config)#no ip domain lookup 
R1(config)#multilink bundle-name authenticated 
R1(config)#no shutdown 
% Incomplete command. 
 
R1(config)#exit 
R1#no shu 
*Mar  1 00:13:28.499: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console 
R1#no shutdown 
      ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
 
 XXXIII
R1#conf t 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
R1(config)#interface fastethernet 0/1 
R1(config-if)#ip address 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.252 
R1(config-if)#no shutdown 
R1(config-if)# 
*Mar  1 00:15:56.591: %LINK-3-UPDOWN: Interface FastEthernet0/1, changed state to up 
*Mar  1 00:15:57.591: %LINEPROTO-5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface FastEthernet0/1, changed state to up 
R1(config-if)#exit 
R1(config)#router rip 
R1(config-router)#version 2 
R1(config-router)# 
*Mar  1 00:16:17.195: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPA0CF5B815B5B Port 2 (full duplex). 
R1(config-router)#network 192.168.0.0 
R1(config-router)#network 192.168.1.0 
R1(config-router)#network 192.168.2.0 
R1(config-router)#exit 
R1(config)#end 
R1# 
*Mar  1 00:16:43.291: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console 
R1# 
 
ROUTER 2 CONFIGURATION  
R2# 
R2#conf t 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
R2(config)#hostname Router2 
Router2(config)#boot-start-marker 
Router2(config)#boot-end-marker 
Router2(config)#no aaa new-model 
Router2(config)#ip cef 
 XXXIV 
Router2(config)#no ip domain lookup 
Router2(config)#multilink bundle-name authenticated 
Router2(config)#interface fastethernet 0/0 
Router2(config-if)#ip address 192.168.2.2 255.255.255.252 
Router2(config-if)#no shutdown 
Router2(config-if)# 
*Mar  1 00:20:26.207: %LINK-3-UPDOWN: Interface FastEthernet0/0, changed state to up 
*Mar  1 00:20:27.207: %LINEPROTO-5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface FastEthernet0/0, changed state to up 
Router2(config-if)#interface fastethernet 0/1 
Router2(config-if)#ip address 192.168.1.5 255.255.255.252 
Router2(config-if)#no shutdown 
Router2(config-if)# 
*Mar  1 00:21:31.351: %LINK-3-UPDOWN: Interface FastEthernet0/1, changed state to up 
*Mar  1 00:21:32.351: %LINEPROTO-5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface FastEthernet0/1, changed state to up 
Router2(config-if)#exit 
Router2(config)#conf t 
                     ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
 
Router2(config)#crypto isa 
*Mar  1 00:22:17.415: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPA0CF5B815B5B Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router2(config)#crypto isakmp enable 
Router2(config)#crypto isakmp policy 10 
Router2(config-isakmp)#authentication pre-share 
Router2(config-isakmp)#hash sha 
Router2(config-isakmp)#encryption aes 256 
Router2(config-isakmp)#group 5 
Router2(config-isakmp)#lifetime 
*Mar  1 00:23:17.415: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPA0CF5B815B5B Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router2(config-isakmp)#lifetime 86400 
Router2(config-isakmp)#exit 
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Router2(config)#crypto isakmp key SCADASECURE address 192.168.2.2 
Router2(config)#crypto isakmp keepalive 10 2 periodic 
Router2(config)# 
*Mar  1 00:24:17.419: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPA0CF5B815B5B Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router2(config)#exit 
Router2#c 
*Mar  1 00:24:21.619: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by consoleo 
Router2#conf t 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
Router2(config)#crypto ipsec transform-set MYSETNAME esp-aes 256 esp-sha-hmac 
Router2(cfg-crypto-trans)#mode tunnel 
Router2(cfg-crypto-trans)#crypto ipsec transform-set MYSETNA 
*Mar  1 00:25:17.423: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPA0CF5B815B5B Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router2(cfg-crypto-trans)#crypto ipsec transform-set MYSETNAME? 
% Unrecognized command 
Router2(cfg-crypto-trans)#crypto ipsec transform-set MYSETNAME 
                          ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
 
Router2(cfg-crypto-trans)#crypto ipsec transform-set MYSETNAME? 
% Unrecognized command 
Router2(cfg-crypto-trans)#crypto ipsec transform-set MYSETNAME 
                          ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
 
Router2(cfg-crypto-trans)#exit 
Router2(config)#access-list permit ip 192.1 
*Mar  1 00:26:17.423: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPA0CF5B815B5B Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router2(config)#$ permit ip 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 
access-list permit ip 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 
 XXXVI 
            ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
 
Router2(config)#$ permit ip 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 
access-list permit ip 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 
            ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
 
Router2(config)#exit 
Router2# 
*Mar  1 00:27:05.131: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console 
Router2#conf t 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
Router2(config)#access-list 101 per 
*Mar  1 00:27:17.419: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPA0CF5B815B5B Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router2(config)#access-list 101 permit ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.2 
*Mar  1 00:28:17.419: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPA0CF5B815B5B Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router2(config)#$ 101 permit ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.2.0 0.0.0.255 
Router2(config)#interface fastethernet 0/1 
Router2(config-if)#duplex full 
Router2(config-if)#no shut 
*Mar  1 00:28:54.195: %LINK-3-UPDOWN: Interface FastEthernet0/1, changed state to up 
Router2(config-if)#no shutdown 
Router2(config-if)#exit 
Router2(config)#crypto 
*Mar  1 00:29:17.459: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPA0CF5B815B5B Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router2(config)#crypto map Router2_to_Router1 10 ipsec-isakmp 
% NOTE: This new crypto map will remain disabled until a peer 
        and a valid access list have been configured. 
Router2(config-crypto-map)#set peer 192.168.2.1 
 XXXVII 
Router2(config-crypto-map)#match address 101 
Router2(config-crypto-map)# 
*Mar  1 00:30:17.467: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPA0CF5B815B5B Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router2(config-crypto-map)#set transform-set MYSETNAME 
Router2(config-crypto-map)#interface fastethernet 0/0 
Router2(config-if)#cryptomap Router2_to_Router1 
*Mar  1 00:31:17.475: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPA0CF5B815B5B Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router2(config-if)#cryptomap Router2_to_Router1 
                         ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
 
Router2(config-if)#crypto map Router2_to_Router1 
Router2(config-if)# 
*Mar  1 00:31:37.835: %CRYPTO-6-ISAKMP_ON_OFF: ISAKMP is ON 
Router2(config-if)#ip route 192.168.0.0 
*Mar  1 00:32:17.475: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPA0CF5B815B5B Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router2(config-if)#ip route 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.2.0 
%Inconsistent address and mask 
Router2(config)#ip route 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.1.0 
%Inconsistent address and mask 
Router2(config)#ip route 192.168.0.0 255.255.255.255 192.168.1.0 
Router2(config)# 
*Mar  1 00:33:17.483: %CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on FastEthernet0/1 (not full duplex), 
with SEPA0CF5B815B5B Port 2 (full duplex). 
Router2(config)#exit 
Router2# 
*Mar  1 00:33:26.291: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console 
Router2#protocol 
Translating "protocol" 
 
Translating "protocol" 
 XXXVIII
 
% Unknown command or computer name, or unable to find computer address 
Router2#conf t 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
Router2(config)#protocol 
                   ^ 
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker. 
 
Router2(config)#p 
% Ambiguous command:  "p" 
Router2(config)#exit 
Router2#p 
Protocol [ip]: 
*Mar  1 00:34:00.131: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console 
 
Target IP address: 
% Bad IP address 
Router2# 
Router2# 
 
